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Abstract 
This Thesis deals with the management of a mixed hydro-thermal system in a com-
petitive electricity market. A notable feature of our market is the presence of long 
term financial contracts, or options. We model the energy spot market as a Coumot 
oligopoly, with a non-competitive fringe. The data from the Coumot model is 
used in an optimisation model based on Dual Dynamic Programming (DDP). The 
optimisation model produces operating rules in the form of a marginal water value 
surface, and these rules guide our medium term simulation model. 
We develop a method for using the Coumot model to produce Demand Curves 
for Release, which describe the amount of water the hydro manager would want 
to release in a given period for a range of marginal water values (prices). We show 
how DDP can be thought of as a process of adding demand curves over time, 
equating marginal costs between periods. 
We find that the efficiency of the market is greatly influenced by the size of the 
contracts, and to a lesser extent by the portfolio of plant that each of the firms has. 
Increasing contracts lead to increasing output, decreasing spot prices, decreasing 
profit, increasing consumer surplus, decreasing marginal water values, and in-
creasing storage trajectories. With appropriate choice of contracts the market can 
be made to mimic perfect competition. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The New Zealand energy sector has undergone significant reform since the mid 
1980s. In 1987 the Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy became the State 
Owned Enterprise (SOE) known as the electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
(ECNZ). At that stage ECNZ generated more than 95 percent of New Zealand's 
electricity requirements, the remainder being made up by small independent gen-
erators, mostly run by local electricity Supply Authorities (ESAs). The transmis-
sion system and associated activities were initially run as a subsidiary, Trans Power. 
In 1994 Trans Power was made an independent SOE. This was seen as an impor-
tant step in the deregulation of the electricity sector, as the high voltage transmis-
sion system is a natural monopoly, and it would be uncompetitive for the gener-
ating company to have control over its activities. 
In 1996 the reform process went a step further with ECNZ being split into two 
separate SOEs, ECNZ and Contact, with approximately 60% and 30% of the total 
generating capacity, respectively. The remaining small generators are being sold 
off, and plans are now underway for new entry. 
On the other side, the ESAs, traditionally owned and run by local body govern-
ment, have also undergone change. They way has been opened for direct compe-
tition, and it is now possible for industrial consumers to purchase electricity from 
other than their local distributor. What were the ESAs are now separate compa-
nies, some still owned by the same local bodies, but others in private hands, and 
traded on the share market. 
1 
2 Chapter 1. Introduction 
In short, the New Zealand electricity sector is now deregulated to such an ex-
tent that entry at almost any level is possible. At the outset of this study it was not 
clear what direction the reforms would take, nor was it clear that they would be 
as far reaching as they have been. The refonn process, and the contribution of OR 
to it, is discussed by Read (1996). 
We set out with the intention of quantifying some of the potential losses in co-
ordination efficiency that deregulation might impose. We decided to concentrate 
on the reservoir management aspects, as that is an area of particular relevance to 
New Zealand. 
1.1 Background 
New Zealand is to some extent following in the footsteps of other nations, espe-
cially the U.K. in its moves towards a deregulated electricity sector. This being 
the case, it would be reasonable to expect that much of the required research int~ 
this area would have already been undertaken. This is partly true, but the New 
Zealand system is somewhat unusual in the world in that up to 75 per cent of our 
electricity comes from hydro power!. We must therefore consider not only the 
scheduling of thermal stations in correct merit order, but also the reservoir man-
agement problem. 
Reservoir management for electricity generation2 is a complicated process. For 
a start, the value of the energy created using hydro-electric generation is calcu-
lated in terms of potential savings from offsets in fuel costs at thermal stations, 
and of shortage costs. These savings would be made at the marginal fuel cost, and 
while we may know what the marginal fuel cost is in the current period (it being 
the cost of generating the last unit of electricity), there will be uncertainty about 
what the marginal fuel cost will be in future time periods. Because we have the 
ability to store water from one period to the next, the water may be used to off-
set fuel costs in future time periods instead of the present one. The value of water 
1 Argentina, Chile and Norway are three other countries with a similar hydro / thermal balance. 
Of these, Norway is only one with an extensively deregulated electricity sector. 
2We do not consider other (equally valid) potential uses of water, such as irrigation or recreation 
in this study. 
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in any given time period, then, is a function of the marginal fuel costs in this pe-
riod and all others forward3• Not knowing which station will be on the margin, 
and hence the marginal fuel cost, in future periods thus adds complexity to our 
problem. 
The inflows to the reservoir over future time periods are not known exactly, 
and must be forecast. This stochastic element of the problem is enough to create 
many complications in itself. 
If, as is often the case, there is more than one hydro reservoir to be considered, 
then we must consider the operation of these reservoirs jointly. Just as the oper-
ation of thermal plant affects the value of water, so does the operation of other 
hydro plant. In theory each additional reservoir will add a further dimension to 
the problem. In practice we often chose to model one or two aggregate reservoirs, 
representing the combined storage of many individual reservoirs. The degree to 
which this sort of aggregation is valid depends not only on the physical attributes 
of the system, such as the location of the reservoirs, the constraints on the system, 
and the correlations that exist among the reservoirs, but also upon the time frame 
of the model. In a long term planning model it may be reasonable to aggregate 
many reservoirs together, as long as the system is not expected to be constrained 
unduly for any long period of time. However, when considering the half-hourly 
releases from it it is more important that each reservoir be modelled explicitly. 
Over the past two decades many computer models have been developed specif-
ically to model various aspects of the New Zealand electricity sector. Aspects to 
be considered include medium term scheduling, short term scheduling, pricing, 
and long term planning. 
Short term scheduling is where the market co-ordinator must decide how, on 
a half hourly basis, they will meet the load in a given week, given the information 
from the medium term schedule. At this level allowances must be made for half 
hourly load changes, and plant availability constraints. This information would 
typically only have appeared in an aggregated form in the medium term schedule. 
In a market situation this will require the Market Co-ordinator (MC) to accept bids 
for supply and demand, and somehow match these to clear the market. 
3 Actually we need only consider future periods until the reservoir is next completely full or 
completely empty. 
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Medium term scheduling is typically done over an annual time horizon di-
vided into weekly intervals. This problem involves deciding how to use the avail-
able generation resources and the transmission network to meet the expected load 
at various load centres, whilst minimising fuel and expected shortage costs. 
Long term planning involves decisions such as where and when should new 
plant be commissioned. Typical long term planning models look between five and 
thirty years into the future, working with periods of between one month and a 
year. 
The issue of pricing is particularly important in a market environment. Prices 
are not only a means of transferring wealth, they also give signals and incentives 
to others. By raising the price of a scarce resource, such as transmission capacity, 
it is possible to encourage cutting back on the use of that resource, thus reducing 
problems of congestion. In an electricity system there may be prices for many dif-
ferent resources. Firstly there is the cost of generation, which will usually vary 
with time of day, and time of year. Then there is the cost of transmission from 
one point in the network to another. The transmission costs are typically not just 
a function of the generating and receiving nodes, but also of all other nodes in the 
transmission network To add to this complication, AC power has both a real and 
reactive components, and prices will not only exist for the real and reactive com-
ponents, but the real prices will interact with the reactive prices. On top of all this, 
there is the need to provide reserve capacity in case of unexpected plant failure etc. 
All of these things add up to a very complicated and intertwined pricing problem, 
which must somehow be dealt with. 
The model we consider in this thesis is a medium term one. We concentrate on 
the reservoir management problem in a market context. We ignore such complexi-
ties as transmission losses, transmission constraints, and the pricing and schedul-
ing of spinning reserve, and we model only a single reservoir system. They are 
ignored not because they would be difficult to model (which may indeed be the 
case), but because the additional effort of including them in this study would not 
provide extra insight into the questions we are asking. Refer to (Ring 1996) for 
a consideration of many aspects of transmission pricing, and to (Drayton-Bright 
1997) for a discussion of spinning reserve issues. 
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The medium term model uses a dual variant of Stochastic Dynamic Program-
ming. Our medium term model (MT) is built over the top of a single period model 
(SP). SP is a Coumot model of a duopoly. The players in the market bid quantities, 
and MC clears the market at the market clearing, or spot price. The demand side 
is modelled via a demand curve. 
1.2 Outline of this thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows 
Chapter 1 This introduction. 
Chapter 2 A review of earlier work on modelling electricity markets, and on meth-
ods for modelling reservoir management. 
Chapter 3 The formulation of our single period model. The model is developed 
as a Coumot model of an oligopoly. The consumer demand is represented 
by either a linear or a constant elasticity demand curve. 
Chapter 4 Discussion of the sensitivity of the model to various parameters. In 
particular we note the sensitivity to the elasticity of demand, and to the set-
ting of contracts. We also compare results for linear demand with those for 
constant elasticity demand. 
Chapter 5 Multi-period theory. Here we extend DDP theory to cover general de-
mand and supply curves, and show how DDP is analogous to addition of 
demand curves over time. We discuss the tractability of this approach to 
modelling in the New Zealand electricity sector. 
Chapter 6 Multi-period results for constant elasticity demand curves. Discussion 
of impact of contracts, and of market structure. 
Chapter 7 Conclusions. 
Appendix A Simulation results. 
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Chapter 2 
Modelling Approaches 
2.1 Introduction 
This study combines two areas of electricity sector modelling. They are the mod-
elling of competi tive electricity mar kets, and the hydro reservoir management prob-
lem. In this chapter we consider the previous work in these two areas, and indi-
cate where this study fits into the existing literature. 
2.2 Models of Competitive Electricity Markets 
Culy, Mayes and Read developed a spreadsheet that models gaming aspects in 
a spot market. This has been applied both to New Zealand (Culy, Mayes & Read 
1990b, Culy, Mayes & Read 1990a) and to Victoria in Australia (Culy & Read 1994). 
Their model allows for several competing companies, each acting independently, 
with perfect information about demand, capacities, contract obligations and vari-
able costs of each other company. The companies each aim for short run profit 
maximisation, taking no account of future effects of their actions. The strategies 
they have modelled are pricing up or down by one step, withholding supply in or-
der to push up the marginal cost, or increasing supply offered at the risk of low-
ering the spot price. Companies may also be specified as price takers, ignoring 
gaming opportunities and bidding at marginal cost. The spreadsheet models a 
repeated game in which decisions for the current round are based on the (known) 
demand for the current round, and on observations of the offers in the previous 
7 
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round. The spreadsheet iterates until an equilibrium is found. The equilibrium is 
not guaranteed to be unique, and may not be the global optimum. Hydro stations 
are modelled as thermal stations with an assumed marginal water value. 
Klemperer & Meyer (1989) presented a model of an oligopoly facing uncertain 
demand. The firms' strategies consisted not of fixed prices or quantities as is the 
case in Bertrand or Coumot models, but instead of a complete supply curve re-
lating quantity to price. They argued that this allows the firm to better adapt to 
uncertainties, by presenting a range of operating points, instead of just a single 
point. They showed how in the absence of uncertainty, there exists a multitude of 
supply function equilibria (SFE), but that with uncertainty the range is greatly re-
duced, sometimes to a single supply function. Klemperer and Meyer modeled the 
uncertainty in demand as an exogenous ex post shock which shifts the demand 
curve horizontally (along the quantity axis). (Green & Newbery (1992) later re-
defined the~uncertainty to be the time axis in the load duration curve, but other-
wise closely followed the analysis of Klemperer and Meyer. This allowed them to 
model load variation throughout the da)" which is an important feature of elec~ 
tricity markets.) Klemperer and Meyer proved that the set of SFEs will contain 
a unique solution if demand can be arbitrarily high with some finite probability 
(shortage can occur at some cost), and that otherwise it will be a connected set, 
with known upper and lower bounds. The analysis includes comparative statics, 
showing that: 
"Firm's equilibrium supply functions are steeper with marginal cost 
curves that are steeper relative to demand, fewer firms, more highly 
differentiated products, and demand uncertainty that is relatively greater 
at higher prices. The steeper are the supply functions firms choose in 
equilibrium, the more closely competition resembles the Coumot model 
(which exogenously imposes vertical supply functions - fixed quan-
tities); with flatter equilibrium supply functions, competition is closer 
to the Bertrand model (which exogenously imposes horizontal supply 
functions - fixed prices)." (Klemperer & Meyer 1989, page 1243) 
The analysis of Klemperer and Meyer seems to be very appropriate to the study 
of electricity markets, as the generating companies typically have several stations 
with different marginal costs, and hence a stepped marginal cost curve. However 
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for their solution approach to be tractable one needs to fit simple functional forms 
to the marginal costs, the market demand and the uncertainty (the LDC). The so-
lution process is also greatly simplified if the firms are identical, as the problem 
is then reduced from solving a coupled system of differential equations down to 
solving a single differential equation. 
Green and Newbery (Green & Newbery 1992) used the techniques provided by 
Klemperer and Meyer (Klemperer & Meyer 1989) to analyse the British electricity 
spot market. In their model, competing firms submitted smooth supply sched-
ules to the spot market, and the market was solved for Nash equilibria as a sin-
gle shot game. They first developed a theoretical model of a symmetric duopoly, 
which they extended to include supply constraints. As well as being more realis-
tic, the supply constraints helped narrow down the range of possible SFEs. This 
model was then adapted to a particular model of an asymmetric duopoly, which 
is a better representation of the British electricity spot market, in which one the 
major firm is 50% larger than its rivaL Green and Newbery stated that: 
"The level of output was 1.3 percent lower and the price 3.8 percent 
higher in the asymmetric case than in the symmetric base case, prof-
its were 5 percent higher, and the deadweight losses involved were 30 
percent higher." (Green & Newbery 1992, page 941) 
As well they noted that the smaller company does much better than its larger ri-
val, the reason being that the larger company has to do much more of the work 
involved in keeping the price high. 
The approach taken by Green and Newbery requires that firms submit a sin-
gle supply curve covering the entire day. Culy et aL (1990b) conducted experi-
ments where the firms were allowed to submit a different offer in each period of 
the day, and compared this with the requirement that the same supply curve cover 
the whole day. They found that requiring a single supply curve offer restricted 
competition and increased the dead-weight 10ss1. 
Green and Newbery went on to fit their theoretical model to the empirical re-
ality of the British spot market. However, due to the computational complexities 
IThey hypothesize that the reason for this is that it makes firms commit to either low demand 
or high demand periods, effectively halving the number of competitors in each period. 
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involved, they limited their simulation to the symmetric case, where competing 
finns have identical characteristics, stating that: 
"It is an order of magnitude more difficult to solve the pair of equations 
for the asymmetric equilibrium than to solve the single equation for the 
symmetric equilibrium ... II (Green & Newbery 1992, page 941). 
For this reason, and the requirement that a single supply curve cover the whole 
day, we hilve not used the techniques of Klemperer and Meyer in this project. One 
of the main aims of this study was to consider what the impact would be of vary-
ing the allocation of power stations to the companies, and for this we need to con-
sider asymmetric markets. 
Green and Newbery's empirical model used a piece-wise quadratic cost func-
tion for the finns2, and a linear demand curve, with a range of slopes (implying 
different elasticities). The duopoly model was compared with a quintopoly. The 
results suggested an average price of £27/MWh for the quintopoly, up from £24 
for marginal cost pricing. The estimates for the duopoly ranged from £32 to £66, 
depending on the slope of the demand curve. While these latter results may seem 
extreme, it should be noted that they do not take account of the threat of entry or 
the threat of regulation. Green and Newbery went some way to account for these 
threats by rebasing their model several years into the future, allowing for new en-
try, and adapting the cost functions accordinglf. The new entrants were assumed 
to price at marginal cost, since they are not likely to be large enough to hold sig-
nificant market power. This revised model predicted prices of £21.7 for marginal 
cost pricing, £26.7 for quintopoly, and a range from £29.7 to £30.1 for duopoly, de-
pending upon the slope of the demand curve. While the sensitivity of the results 
to the slope of the demand curve was greatly reduced by this new entry, there was 
still a significant deadweight loss resulting from the shift in price/quantity. The 
total generation under marginal cost pricing was predicted to be 273 TWh, which 
gives a total spending on energy of 273 TWh x £21.7/Mwh = £5924 million. The 
2 As Borenstein & Bushnell (1997) note generator's cost functions are better represented by step 
functions, but no attempt has been made to extend the supply function equilibria approach to such 
cost functions. 
3This only accouri.ts for likely new entrant behaviour once in the market. It does not, for exam-
ple, give indication of the likely effect these threats would have of putting a cap on the spot price. 
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deadweight loss was reported as ranging from -£54 million4 for quintopoly to 
£108 - £412 million for the duopoly cases. In percentage terms these range from 
-1 percent to +7 percent of the total energy spending. 
A drawback of the analysis of Green & Newbery (1992) is that it doesn't ex-
plicitly consider the effects of contracts. However Green (1993) does consider the 
impact of contracts on the short term market, and goes on to model the market for 
long term contracts. 
Green (1993) used a Coumot model of a symmetric duopoly. The duopolists 
had quadratic cost functions, and hence linear marginal cost. The residual de-
mand the duopolists faced was assumed to be linear. The market for long-term 
contracts was modelled as equivalent to Bertrand competition. The equilibrium 
outcome of the model with limited competition in the pool, but fierce competition 
in the contract market, was full contracting and marginal cost pricing. Green re-
ported that this result is analogous to that of Allaz & Vila (1993). Recognising that 
full contracting is an unlikely outcome, Green changed to a Coumot model of the 
contract market (for ease of modelling) and derived results which showed that: 
" . .. the effect of even the most limited competition in the contract mar-
ket will be to increase output in the spot market by up to 20%, and re-
duce the gap between price and marginal cost by up to 40%. ... The 
presence of an uncompetitive contract market has produced a substan-
tial increase in welfare, and the gains from the more competitive mar-
ket that actually exists will be even greater." (Green 1993, page 5) 
Green went on to consider the effects of risk aversion, which tended to increase 
the generators' use of the contract market. Lastly, in a multi-period model Green 
showed that: 
" . .. full contracting will not necessarily bring pool prices down to marginal 
costs if the generators expect to sell future contracts at better prices if 
they keep the pool prices high." (Green 1993, page 12) 
Powell (1993) used a Coumot model of contracting in the electricity industry. 
He first considered the single period analysis, using a Coumot model with a linear 
4The negative deadweight loss resulted from a change in investment from the status quo. Un-
der the status quo there was no new investment, and hence less efficient plant was sometimes used. 
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inverse demand function. He then tackled the issue of recontracting using a mean-
variance utility approach. Powell's main conclusions were that a high degree of 
contracting implies output will be higher and price will be lower than otherwise, 
and that risk-averse RECS5 will hedge against shifts in the spot price. The degree 
of hedging will depend upon the behaviour of the generators. If the generators 
are truly non-cooperative, then according to Powell the competitive result may 
emerge. If the generators collude, then spot prices will be above marginal cost, 
and hedging will only be partial. If the generators collude only through the use 
of futures, then the degree of hedging may be lower still. 
Green (1993) and Powell (1993) both present results indicating that the way in 
which contracts are re-negotiated is important. While we do not consider the re-
negotiating of contracts in this study, we do analyse system operation for a wide 
range of contracts. See Batstone (1997) for further consideration of contract nego-
tiation and risk management in a hydro system. 
Andersson & Bergman (1995) consider a similar situation to Green & Newbery 
(1992), only this time based on the Swedish electricity market. Their analysis uses 
a Cournot model, chosen for its ability to easily handle non-symmetric firms, a 
feature desirable for our analysis too. The time frame for their analysis is two to 
three years, long enough to cover seasonal variations, but not so long'as to be con-
cerned with entry or exit. Although the Swedish market has a large component 
of hydro generation (up to 50%), and the hydro capacity does vary considerably 
from year to year, Andersson & Bergman chose to model hydro on an average ba-
sis, and have no reservoir management rules in their model. Their analysis shows 
that given the then existing firm structure and the high degree of concentration 
(two large firms have between them 75% of capacity) deregulation is not a suf-
ficient condition for lower equilibrium prices, the stated goal. Alternatives such 
as five equal sized firms (c.f. (Green & Newbery 1992» or an increase in demand 
side concentration would, they say, reduce significantly the possibility of the firms 
influencing the market price. 
SRECs are the Regional Electricity Companies who buy from the pool. 
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2.3 Reservoir Management Models 
While many reservoir management models have been reported in the past, very 
few have explicitly considered the reservoir management problem in the context 
of a competitive wholesale electricity market. 
Approaches used in the past have included linear programming (LP), non-linear 
programming (NLP), dynamic programming (DP) and heuristic methods. The LP, 
NLP and DP methods have been approached from both a primal and a dual per-
spective, and many have included some of the stochastic elements of the problem. 
Because of the complexity of the reservoir management problem it is necessary to 
take steps to reduce the computational effort involved. One way of achieving this 
is by leaving out certain aspects, such as stochasticity. Another method is aggre-
gation of similar entities, such as modelling several small reservoirs, each with 
similar characteristics, as one aggregate reservoir. A third method is decompo-
sition, where the system is modelled as a set of disjoint sub-systems with some 
scheme for combining the results of these sub-systems together and trading them 
off against each other. As well as these methods, simulation has been used, often 
for checking the proposals put forward by the former mentioned methods. Hav-
ing derived some operating rules, via mathematical programming say, these rules 
can be checked by simulating the operation of the system. 
2.3.1 The New Zealand System 
There are several key features which characterise the New Zealand electricity sys-
tem from a modelling perspective. Probably the most important of these is the 
large proportion of hydro plant. In 1991, 21 845 Gwh out of a total of 29556 Gwh 
were produced by hydro plant (ECNZ 1991). Another major feature is the inter-
island DC link between the South Island and the North Island. In the past, the lim-
ited capacity of this link has effectively separated the two islands from each other, 
especially from the point of view of aggregating reservoir storage when modelling. 
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Since expansion in 1991, though, this has been less of a concem6• A third impor-
tant feature is the stochastic nature of the inflows to the hydro reservoirs. Read & 
Boshier (1989) reported tests which show that, at least for the New Zealand sys-
tem, the stochastic nature of the inflows is very important. With these features in 
mind, we present a selective review of reservoir management models appropriate 
for the New Zealand system. 
Reservoir management models designed for the New Zealand system in the 
past include the Basic Rule Curve approach (Brudenell & Gilbreath 1959), LP /Network 
Flows (Boshier & Lermit 1977), Non-Linear Decomposition as used in France by 
EDF (Read 1979), the STAGE model (Boshier, Manning & Read 1983), and the cur-
rent system known as PRISM, based on Dual Dynamic Programming (Read & George 
1990) in the RESOP model (Read 1989, Culy 1990). More recently Scott & Read 
(1996) described the model which forms the basis of this thesis. 
2.3.2 Competitive Reservoir Models 
While there are now many deregulated energy markets throughout the world, there 
are relatively few where hydro generation is a major part of the overall capac-
ity. Norway, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil are a few notable exceptions. While 
there has been some recent literature on transmission pricing in Chile (Rudnick, 
Palmer, Cura & Silva 1995), we are not aware of any on reservoir management 
under deregulation. There are others where there are large hydro plants with rel-
atively little storage capacity, such as in Victoria, Australia. Without storage there 
is little inter-temporal linkage, and the reservoir management problem as is faced 
in New Zealand disappears. In this section we briefly review some of the compet-
itive reservoir mangement models that exist. 
In 1991 the Norwegian Parliament moved to deregulate their power market. 
To quote from (Wiedswang 1993): 
"A new Energy Act came into force on 1 January 1991. This act allows a 
general third party access, TPA, that is to say free access on equal terms 
for everyone to transmit power through all Norwegian transmission 
6Ironically reserve requirements often mean that the link cannot be run at full capacity. When 
at full capacity the possibility that a pole of the link fails may require greater reserve capacity than 
is available in the North Island. 
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networks. Within their geographical area distribution companies have 
an obligation to connect all consumers, but no exclusive right to sup-
ply power. Distribution companies have no duty to meet an increased 
consumption in their area through own supplies." 
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In 199299.7 percent of the 117 TWh produced in Norway was from hydro plant. 
There are more than 200 distribution companies (equivalent to our ESAs). Over 
95 percent of the capacity is held by the 34 largest power producers. 
The Norwegian Research Institute of Electricity Supply (EFI) have developed 
methods for the optimal scheduling of a hydro-dominated power system U ohannesen 
& Flatab01989,Flatab0, Olaussen, Hornnes, Haugstad,Iohannesen & Nyland 1988). 
The modelling approaches used at EFI vary with the length of the planning hori-
zon. For the short- and medium-term there is quite detailed representation of in-
dividual reservoirs, accounting for head effect, and startup and shutdown costs 
for thermal plant, with deterministic inflow and demand levels. This is based on 
network linear programming, with an iterative process to cover the (integer) unit 
cOlrunitment problem. In the long-term the models are deterministic out to a cer-
tain point in time, and stochastic from there on. The long-term models are based 
on a variant of SDP, the "water value method". By using a decomposition ap-
proach EFI incorporate their single reservoir model into a "Power Pool Model", 
in which several subsystems are connected via a power pool, where trading oc-
curs at a spot price. There is no global optimisation, but in an iterative process 
with some operator intervention the model can be used to improve the operation 
of the total system. 
While the EFI models do allow for trade on the spot market, there is no optimi-
sation, as such, of spot trading. For the mid-term model there is an iterative pro-
cess, with possible operator intervention, in which spot market bids are adapted 
until some equilibrium is reached. No attempt is made to look beyond the first 
order reactions of the other companies. 
More recently Halseth (1997) has described a model for analysing market power 
in the Nordic electricity market. It is based on a Coumot model of the major play-
ers in the Nordic market. Halseth considers co-operation (collusion) between com-
panies, and finds (not unexpectedly) that collusion is profitable as long as the ma-
jor company is involved, and the more companies involved, the better. He does 
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not mention any optimisation of the hydro system, nor does he consider the im-
pact of contracts. 
Borenstein & Bushnell (1997) have developed a market simulation model of the 
California electricity market, with the intention of examining potential for market 
power. They have done this in response to what they see as a major shortcoming 
of previous market power studies, that being they have all relied on concentration 
measures, which fail to account for demand and supply dynamics. They chose a 
Coumot model to 
/I • •• strike a balance between detailed representation of the costs and 
incentives of competitors and an explicit, functional representation of 
the strategies of market participants." (Borenstein & Bushnell 1997, 
page 7) 
As part of their justification for the Coumot model, Borenstein & Bushnell point 
out that the concept of the Bertrand equilibrium is not really appropriate in a mar-
ket where infinite expansion is not a realistic possibility. They refer to Kreps & 
Scheinkman (1983) who argued that when firms first choose capacities, then com-
pete on price, as in the Bertrand model, the outcome may be closely approximated 
by a Coumot model anyway. 
Capacity constraints are an important feature of electricity markets, especially 
in the short term (outage for maintenance etc.) and in the medium term (it takes 
years and not weeks to commission new power stations). 
Borenstein & Bushnell do not attempt to model entry or exit, nor collusion. 
They do point out that at least some of the entry and exit activities can be accounted 
for by varying elasticities, which they do analyse. Their model does include some 
transmission constraints and losses. They model a competitive fringe of price tak-
ers7 as well as Coumot firms. Hydro generation is not optimally scheduled, al-
though some effort is made via the "peak-shaving" method. This uses quantity 
as an approximation to marginal revenue, leading to sub-optimal behaviour. In 
spite of the inaccuracies of the peak-shaving approach Borenstein & Bushnell do 
have one of the few reported models of a competitive market which includes some 
7The capacity of the price takers is subtracted from the industry demand curve to leave a resid-
ual demand that the Cournot players face. 
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form of reservoir mangement. There is no consideration given to the influence of 
contracts. 
2.4 Conel usions 
It seems that none of the competitive reservoir models explicitly consider the im-
pact of contracts, yet in all shldies where contracts have been modelled they have 
been found to have a significant effect. Although the SFE methods of Klemperer 
and Meyer seem to fit well within the framework of an electricity market, com-
putational difficulties and the required functional forms make these methods in-
appropriate for our study. Instead we choose (as did Green, and Allaz ands Vila) 
to use a Coumot game for the single period model, with explicit consideration of 
contracts. However, as will be detailed in Chapter 3, we explicitly model each step 
in the marginal cost curves, and we also consider each sub-period of the LDC sep-
arately. We do not attempt to produce a single consistent supply function for each 
periodS. 
We have chosen to use dual stochastic dynamic programming (DSDP) for the 
long term model for the following reasons: 
• it has been applied to the New Zealand system before, and is at the heart of 
the currently used PRISM and SPECTRA models, allowing for comparison 
with accepted results, 
• it does not require that a well defined underlying objective function exist, 
• the results from DSDP lend themselves to graphical intelpretation (water 
value surfaces and guidelines especially), 
• DSDP has a nice interpretation in terms of demand curves, which adds some 
insight to the problem, 
• it is relatively simple to implement, and (at least for one or two reservoir 
models) the computational burden is low enough for today's computers to 
cope with in reasonable time, and 
8Drayton-Bright (1997) suggests that such a function does not exist in all cases. In particular, 
in a constrained hydro system the marginal value of water may well change throughout the day; 
suggesting different levels of output for the same price in different sub-periods. 
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• there are no problems with convergence, as there sometimes are in the math 
programming methods. 
To keep our model simple we have chosen to model a single aggregate reservoir, 
and to ignore transmission constraints, reserve capacity requirements, transmis-
sion losses, startup and shutdown costs, and reservoir head effects. Plant avail-
ability restrictions and plant efficiency characteristics can be modelled, but not in 
a dynamic sense. 
Chapter 3 
Single Period Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
The New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM) (EMCO 1996) is a self-regulatory 
and voluntary environment established in 1994 to (among other things) promote 
cost minimisation and competitive pricing, allow unbiased new entry, deter anti-
competitive behaviour and provide certainty as to future market conditions. The 
market participants are member companies of the NZEM, and they interact under 
the rules of the NZEM. The NZEM has three classes of participant, Generator, Pur-
chaser and Trader. Generators supply electricity to the grid. Purchasers consume 
electricity from the grid, and traders participate in the financial and contractual 
arrangements of the NZEM. Companies may belong to any or all of the classes. 
For our purposes we can divide the electricity market into two sections. On 
the one hand we have what we will refer to as the dispatch market and on the other 
hand we have the contract market. 
The dispatch market is the clearing mechanism for the half-hourly dispatch. 
Generators put in offers to sell, and Purchasers put in bids to buYt and these are 
matched to find the market clearing dispatch and price. 
The contract market is a financial market providing futures type options on the 
forthcoming electricity prices. In this study we refer to these as long term contracts 
and we consider them to be pre~determined in the sense that they are outside the 
scope of our optimisation process. 
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This Chapter is concerned with the dispatch market, and in particular with in-
dividual half-hour sub-periods. 
The dispatch market nominally runs from 3 am one day to 3 am the next day. 
By noon of the day before participants are supposed to have put in offers and bids 
for the day ahead. The offers are stepped marginal cost (supply) functions which 
correspond to piecewise-linear cost functions (Figure 3.1. Each thermal unit and 
each hydro station can offer such a supply curve, with at most five distinct marginal 
costs in it. There is no provision for linking supply curves either between sta-
tions, or inter-temporally, except that thennal generators can specify ramp rate1 
constraints2 . The bids, like the offers, are stepped demand functions, correspond-
ing to piecewise-linear costs. The purchasers are allowed up to ten tranches in 
each bid. 
The bids and offers are cleared against each other by around 2 pm to give a day 
ahead schedule. All parties are then free to change their bids, and the market is 
re-cleared every two hours up until four hours before the-dispatch time. From this 
time participants can only change their bids if they have a good reason3. Genera-
tors are expected to stick with their offers, and purchasers are supposed to notify 
the market if their expected loads differ from their bids by more than 10 MW at 
any node in the network. The market clearing prices are only indicative at this 
stage. 
Immediately prior to dispatch time the market is cleared again, but this time 
based on forecast load rather than bid load. This forecast is done in much the same 
way as it was before deregulation, and allows the system operators to adjust for 
any discrepancies they have good reason to expect to occur. This price is still pro-
visional. The market is the cleared in real time and dispatched by the system op-
erators. The provisional prices are now given based on the bids and offers, and 
the actual dispatch. However it is not until one month later that the prices are 
finalised. This gives all participants time to review the events that lead to price 
shocks etc., and allows for adjustments to be made if needed. 
1 Ramp rates are only accounted for in a forward direction. 
2There is provision for hydro stations on the same river chain to shift load from one to the other 
provided the same nett input to the specified nodes on the grid is made. 
3It is not clear if an equipment failure, a sudden cold snap, or an extreme forecast spot price 
constitutes a good reason. 
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Integrated with the market for energy is the market for reserve energy. In order 
to avoid power cuts in the event of equipment failure a certain amount of plant is 
kept in a state where it can rapidly provide reserve power in the event of a failure. 
In New Zealand two categories of reserve are provided, based on how quickly 
plant can respond. The categories are six and sixty second. We do not consider 
the market for reserve power in this Thesis, but see (Drayton-Bright 1997) for a 
detailed analysis of this. 
There are also arrangements to compensate generators who are asked to oper-
ate contrary to their bids for some reason. In particular generators may be asked 
to provide reactive power in some regions, and side payments are made in these 
cases. Again we do not consider this issue, but (Ring 1996) does discuss some as-
pects of this in the context of nodal pricing. 
Perfectly competitive generators will bid into the market at exactly their marginal 
costs. In the absence of long-term contracts a monopolist or oligopolist would bid 
in above their marginal cost to extract extra profits. The question we are concerned 
with in this chapter is how should an oligopolist behave given its contract portfo-
lio and marginal costs? 
3.2 Playing Games 
When a firm has sufficient market power that they can profitably influence the 
spot market price, it is natural for that firm to take this into account when deciding 
how much to offer to the market, and at what price. This issue is well discussed 
in (Tirole 1988, Friedman 1977, Friedman 1984, Friedman 1983) and many others. 
Non-cooperative game theory is the most applied theory in this area. The NZEM 
has some interesting features which are relevant from the game theoretical point 
of view. In particular, there is a small number of generators (ECNZ and Contact 
together represent well over 90% of the generating capacity), the station capaci-
ties are (at this point in time) well known by everyone, and the marginal costs are 
(again at this point) reasonably well known. In addition there is a long-term con-
tract market which offers hedges against spot price variations for many years into 
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the future4 • 
Traditional analysis has been of two broad types. In the Coumot game the 
players offer quantities to the market. The market is cleared with the market clear-
ing price coming from the (inverse) consumer demand curve. In the Bertrand game 
the players offer in prices, and the market is cleared to determine the quantities. 
More recently (Klemperer & Meyer 1989) developed the idea of supply function 
equilibria where players offer in entire supply functions (see § 2 for a brief review). 
Different analyses are appropriate depending on whether the game is a one off, 
or is to be repeated until an equilibrium is reached. The usual definition is of the 
Nash equilibrium: 
A set of actions is in Nash equilibrium if, given the actions of its rivals, 
a firm cannot increase its own profit by choosing an action other than 
its equilibrium action. (Tirole 1988, p 206) 
The process of putting in bids and offers a day ahead, then revising th~m every 
two hours certainly suggests that the NZEM could well be modelled as a multi-:-
stage game. This process is repeated every day. We now move on to describe the 
way we have modelled the NZEM. 
At. the outset of this study the NZEM did not exist, and the exact rules of its 
operation were far from being formulated. Indeed it was not even clear that the 
electricity sector would be deregulated to the extent that it has been. Consider-
ing as our main goal developing a method for modelling and optimising reser-
voir management in a deregulated environments, we decided that for this study 
at least it would be reasonable to use a relatively simple model of the single period 
interaction. To this end we formulated the single period model as a single stage 
Coumot oligopoly, with the demand side represented by a simple demand curve. 
Given the relatively large number of purchasers compared with the small number 
of generators it seems reasonable to model the demand side as pure competition. 
4ECNZ was required by the Government to offer 87% of its dry year capacity on long-term con-
tract at reasonable prices for up to five years out from the establishment of the electricity market on 
1 September 1996. Firm capacity is defined as all thermal and geothermal plant, plus mean hydro 
capacity. 
5 At the time the basic Cournot model applied to the electricity sector was (fairly) unique too. 
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3.3 Contracts 
Each of the generating companies may have financial contracts with consumers 
to sell them a pre-arranged quantity of electricity, at a pre-arranged strike price. 
These may be traded via the NZEM, or on some other futures type market. These 
contracts are private, in the sense that they are arranged outside of the spot market, 
and the strike prices are not directly affected by the spot price in any given period 6 . 
One way of viewing this transaction is to say that the generating company sells 
all the electricity it generates to the consumer at the strike price, and the consumer 
onsells any surplus to the spot market at the spot price. Equivalently the genera-
tor and consumer deal with the spot market, with the consumer being compen-
sated by the generating company (or vice versa) for the difference between the 
spot price and the contract price on the contract quantity. Technically such a con-
tract is known as a two way option. See (Brealey & Myers 1984) or any other corpo-
rate finance text for a detailed analysis of financial contracts. 
As well as the contracts with the consumers, the generating companies may 
sell each other one way contracts, known as call options. Call options are of the 
form: we will charge you up to the strike price and no more. 
We agree to compensate you in the event that the spot price is higher 
than the strike price, and we will compensate you the price difference 
multiplied by the contract quantity. 
These would provide back-up for hydro stations in the event of unexpected short-
age, and so we commonly refer to these as back-up contracts. The opposite to the 
call options is the put options. Put loosely, these are of the form: you will buy from 
us at no less than the strike price: 
You agree to compensate us in the event that the spot price is lower 
than the strike price, and you will compensate us the price difference 
multiplied by the contract quantity. 
Note that these contracts substantially alter generator objectives. In the absence 
of c~mtracts we would expect generators to have incentives to force prices up by 
6Spot prices will affect future contract prices in that the value of the contracts depends largely 
on the expected future spot prices, and these are certainly influenced by current spot prices. 
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restricting supply. But, as we show later, this incentive is greatly reduced if most 
sales are covered by contracts. Indeed a generating company which has contracted 
for more than it can economically produce in a given period will be a nett buyer, 
and will try to drive the market price down. (See Chapter 4 for examples of this.) 
We might also expect contracts to alter consumer behaviour, but for the purposes 
of this study we ignore all demand side second order effects. 
3.4 Types of Players 
We consider two types of generating companies, or players, both of which are likely 
to appear in a wholesale electricity market. The first is the perfect competitor, and 
the second is the game player. 
3.4.1 Perfect Competitors 
The perfect competitor will generate fully from all stations with marginal costs 
below the spot price, generate as much as the market requires if marginal, and 
will not generate anything at all from stations with marginal costs higher than the 
spot price. Thus the perfect competitor will put in offers corresponding exactly to 
the generating capacities and marginal costs of its stations. This is the base case 
in the sense that the perfect competitor makes the most efficient use of the gen-
erating resources available. It also corresponds to the perfectly coordinated sys-
tem operated to minimise fuel cost whilst meeting load, the system in place before 
deregulation. 
3.4.2 Game Players 
The second type of player is the game player, who is prepared to, and capable of 
adjusting the offers to the market in order to extract higher profits. 
As we will soon see, a game player who is over-contracted, that is one who has 
contracts for more electricity than they can generate at a marginal cost at or below 
the spot price, will try to lower the spot price, since they will have to buy in the 
difference between the contract quantity and their capacity at the spot price. 
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Similarly, a game player who is under contracted will try to increase the spot 
price, since they will sell any excess electricity to the market at the spot price. 
A game player who is over-contracted is a nett buyer on the spot market, and 
one who is under-contracted is a nett seller on the spot market. 
Game players and perfect competitors are both assumed to have the objective 
of maximising their overall profit. Game players are aware that their actions will 
influence the market, but perfect competitors are either unaware of this possibility, 
or too small to have any influence7• 
3.5 Formulation of the Full Model 
Generating companies are faced with the problem of coordinating their use of hy-
dro and thermal stations throughout the time horizon. They must trade off the use 
of water now with saving it for use in later periods when it may be more valuable. 
Limited water storage capacity must be taken into account, as must restrictions on 
maximum (and possibly minimum) generation levels for each station. In practice, 
the inflow is not known in advance, and must be forecast, with some uncertainty. 
Thus the problem is actually stochastic in nature, a complication which we must 
deal with in the multi-period model. 
In words, the objective of each generating company could be described as: 
To maximise revenue minus fuel costs over the whole of the planning 
horizon, subject to meeting the restrictions on generation levels and 
water storage in each period. 
In this Chapter we restrict our analysis to a single period, ignoring any future 
effects of our actions. 
We have chosen not to model any spatial complexities of the system, such as 
transmission losses, transmission constraints, and the location of demand and sup-
ply (generation) nodes, but see (Ring 1996) for a treatment of these. The demand 
is modelled by the (inverse) consumer demand curve, p(g), which describes the 
market price, p, for any given total (i.e. the whole market) generation level, g. We 
7:Note that ownership can make a big difference here. A supply authority with a power station 
and also with considerable obligation to supply to local consumers will likely behave more like a 
perfect competitor than a monopolist. 
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will later (in § 3.7 and § 3.8) consider two specific cases of demand curves, linear 
demand and constant elasticity of demand. 
The total generation for the market is comprised of the generation for all the 
stations of all the firms. We will index the firms by subscript j = 1 ... J and each 
firm's stations by a second subscript i E T. Let: 
(3.1) 
be the total generation for firm j, and 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
be the vector of generation levels for each firm. We will commonly refer to the 
total generation level for the market by the scalar g: 
(3.4) 
Each firm will receive the spot price, p(g) for each unit they generate. In total 
for each firm this will be: 
L gjiP(g) = gjp(g) (3.5) 
iEI 
Each station will have upper and lower bounds on its generation as described 
by: 
(3.6) 
In a single period we can treat the hydro stations the same as thermal stations 
by assuming some marginal value of water in place of the marginal fuel costs. 
8 Although each hydro station will have an associated storage reservoir, in the single period 
storage bounds can be incorporated into the generation bounds (3.6). 
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Capacity Marginal Cost 
Station 1 100 1.0 
Station 2 150 2.0 
Station 3 100 4.0 
Station 4 300 6.0 
Station 5 100 7.0 
Table 3.1: Station characteristics as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Thermal generation comes at a cost, Cji(gji), which we assume to be an increas-
ing function of gji. Combining the cost functions Cji(gji) together in merit order 
gives us the cost function for the company: 
Cj(gj) :L Cji(gji) (3.7) 
iET 
If we ignore start-up and shut-down costs and assume the the efficiency curves to 
be piece-wise linear, then this function Cji(gji) will be a stepped supply curve. An 
example is shown in Figure 3.1 for the fictitious station capacities and marginal 
costs of Table 3.1. Note that there are vertical steps in the marginal cost curve, 
which means that the marginal cost curve is not strictly a ftmction,.and that this 
will lead to complications when solving for the optimal generation. However it 
will be sufficient for us to know that the marginal cost is bounded both above and 
below for these vertical sections. 
For a given contract quantity, kj' a strike price of Wj and a particular spot price, 
p(g), the station owner will have an obligation of: 
(3.8) 
This can be separated into two parts, those being a fixed revenue of kjwj and a 
variable cost of kjp(g), the latter varying with the spot price. From a profit max-
imising point of view, the fixed revenue does not matter, and so we will only in-
clude the variable part in our objective function to be maximised. 
As we stated earlier, we follow the Cournot assumptions, and hence the deci-
sion variable for each firm is the quantity to offer. For the most part of this chap-
ter we will proceed as if our firms have unlimited generating capacity, ignoring 
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the generation bounds. We will deal with generation bounds in section § 3.9. Our 
problem is then: 
(3.9) 
Note that this is an tmconstrained maximisation problem. At the optimum the 
first derivative of C will be zero. Recall the Coumot assumption that each firm will 
optimise assuming that the other players' outputs are fixed. The first derivative 
is then: 
8p dej p(g) + -[g. - k·] --8gj J J dg j 
Let us define the marginal cost for our company to be 
de· 7r' __ 1 
J - dgj 
Setting (3.10) to zero, we get: 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
Hence we have the expected necessary condition that the company should gen-
erate at a level which will equate marginal cost with marginal profit. 
This result is identical in form to the standard Coumot result except that we 
have nett generation, gj - kj, instead of gj. The effect of this is to "distort" output 
towards the contract quantities. If we are behaving as perfect competitors then 
we assume that the derivative *t = 0, and we simply equate marginal cost with 
price. 
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3.6 Market Equilibrium 
If we assume that each of the generating companies has an objective function of 
the form defined above (3.9), and that they each know the others' true marginal 
fuel costs, then at a market equilibrium equation (3.12) must be satisfied for each 
of the generating companies simultaneously. The interpretation of this is that each 
generating company will have reached a local maximum in their profits, that is, a 
Nash equilibrium. 
-For now l~t us only concern ourselves with finding equilibria within a given 
time period. These will later be combined using Dual Dynamic Programming to 
derive operating strategies for the multi-period problem. If we know the marginal 
costs and contract levels of each companJ" and we know explicitly the market de-
mand curve, then we may proceed as follows. 
Each plc~.yer, j, will solve (3.9) to determine their own marginal costs to satisfy 
(3.12), but at equilibrium each must face the same market price, p(g). Recall that 
gj' k j and 1fj are player j's generation, contracts and marginal costs, respectively. 
Define the market levels as: 
J 
g 2:gj 
j=l 
J 
k 2:kj 
j=l 
J 7f' 
if 2: -.l. 
j=l J 
Now each company must solve equation (3.12): 
8p 
p(g)=7fj- 8gj [gj-kj] Vj=1, ... ,J. 
Adding these and dividing through by J yields 
_ dpg - k 
p(g) = 7f - dg-J-
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
where we have used the fact that in our model we have exactly one (undifferenti-
ated) product, generation, and price is function of the sum of the individual gen-
eration levels, so -i:; = ~ V j = 1, ... , J. In words, equation (3.17) simply states 
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that the market price will be equal to the average marginal cost plus the change 
in price due to the average amount of surplus (nett spot) generation. 
If we know the marginal costs and contract levels for each player, and we have 
an expression for market price as a function of total generation, then we may solve 
equation (3.17) for g, the total generation level. With this we can evaluate p(g), 
the market price, and substitute this back into equation (3.12) for each player, and 
hence calculate their individual generation levels, gj. 
Combining and rearranging (3.16) and (3.17) gives us the following market 
share relationship: 
1 'ifj - if 
J + ~ [g - k] (3.18) 
The market share for firm j will be the even share J plus an adjustment based 
on the difference between their marginal cost and the average over all firms, di-
vided by the price differential due to total generation not being exactly equal to 
total contracts. Note that, as expected, the sum of market shares over all J firms 
will equal one. It is interesting to consider the effect of the ratio of'ifj to if on the 
market share. As we have an undifferentiated product, the total nett output, 9 - k 
is dependent only on the average levels, if, not on the individual levels, 'ifj. This 
means, for example, that two firms with marginal costs of 'if 1 = 2 and 11"2 = 4 will 
produce between them the same total nett output as firms with marginal costs of 
'ifl = 1 and'if2 =5, but the ratio of gl - k1 to g2 - k2 will be different. Firm one 
will have a greater market share in the latter case than in the former. Note also 
the effect of the slope of the demand curve, ~ on the ratio of market shares. If the 
slope were ~ = 2 in the former example, and ~ = 4 in the latter, then the market 
shares would be the same in each case. The two opposing effects are on one hand 
the deviation of a firm's marginal cost from the average marginal cost, and on the 
other hand the sensitivty of the consumers to changes in price. 
In practice the marginal costs of each company vary with output, and these 
are usually represented as a stepped curve, such as that in Figure 3.1. This com-
plicates our search for equilibria, as it makes it more difficult to get closed-form 
solutions to (3.17). However, if we partition the generation for each company into 
regions of constant marginal cost9 then we can solve (3.17) in each of these regions, 
9 Also included are the vertical regions of constant output but varying marginal cost. 
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and look for admissible solutions. By admissible we mean that the generation lev-
els are within the bounds implied by the particular marginal cost. We must then 
consider the possibility that more than one admissible solution may exist, and this 
is done in § 3.9.1. For now we will proceed assuming that the marginal cost is not 
a function of the generation level, and that the firms each have infinite capacity. 
In the next section consider market behaviour under the assumption that the 
market demand can be described by linear demand curves. 
3.7 Response Curves Under the Assumption of Linear 
Demand Curves 
Assume that we have a reference point, (Po, go), and that the market d~mand in 
any given p.eriod can be described by a simple linear relationship between price 
and demand: 
and the slope is then 
p(g) = Po + p[g 90], 
dp 
--p dg - . 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
The usual requirement of downward sloping demand implies that p < O. Substi-
tuting (3.19) and (3.20) into (3.17) gives 
_ p[g - k] 
Po + p[g - go] = 7r - 1 . 
We can rearrange to make 9 the subject thus 
* if 1 - Pol + pgol + pk g= 
p[l +1] 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
which is the Coumot equilibrium market generation amount. The corresponding 
price, 1), found by substituting g back into (3.19), is 
* Po + if 1 + pk - pgo 
p= 1+1 (3.23) 
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We now have closed form expressions for the market price and generation levels, 
and with these it is simple to obtain generation levels for individual companies by 
substituting back into (3.12), giving 
* 
* 7rj - P 9j = kj + ----"-------=--p 
_ k. + 7rj [J + 1] - Po - 1f J - pk + P90 
- J p[J + 1] .' 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
An example might help to clarify the above. Consider the case of two firms 
j = {I, 2} with marginal costs of 7r} = 1.5 and 7r2 = 2.5, and contract obligations 
of k} = 800 and k2 = 1200 with demand curve parameters Po = 3, p = -10-3 and 
90 = 2000. Hence we have: 
J=2 
1.5 + 2.5 
1f=---
2 
= 2.0 
k = 800 + 1200 
= 2000. 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
Substituting these values into (3.22) gives us a value for the market generation 
* 8000 
9=--· 3 
The market price is then (from (3.23» 
* 7 p=-3' 
We can check these for consistency in (3.19) 
p = 3 - 10-3 X [80
3
00 - 2000] 
7 
-
3 
Further, the individual generations can now be found using (3.25) 
4900 
9}=--3 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
(3.31) 
(3.32) 
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and 
3100 
92=--3 
(3.33) 
Note that gl + g2 = 490013100 9, as expected. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Note 
that both firms are producing, even though the spot price is below 1l"2' Firm two 
finds it worthwhile producing at a marginal loss in order to lower the spot price, 
which they must pay on the shortfall between their generation and contracts. This 
illustrates the typical scenario. If the spot price is above a firm's marginal pro-
duction cost then they will produce more than their contracted amount. If the 
spot price is lower than their marginal cost then they will produce less tha their 
contracted amount. In general terms, production will fall between the contract 
amount and the amount that a perfect competitor would produce at the prevail-
ing spot price. 
In this section we have derived the Coumot equilibrium conditions for a mar-
ket with J firms of infinite size, where each firm has some contract commitment, 
kj, constant marginal costs, 1l"j, and the industry demand can be described by a 
simple linear demand curve. In the next section we repeat this analysis for the 
case of constant elasticity demand curves. 
3.8 Response Curves Under the Assumption of Con-
stant Elasticity of Demand 
In this section we consider market behaviour under the assumption that the mar-
ket demand can be described by constant elasticity demand curves. 
Define the price elasticity of demand to be 
Bgp 
E --
Bpg 
(3.34) 
where p is the market price, and 9 is the quantity demanded. Now any point on 
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the demand curve can be described by equation (3.35) or equation (3.36) 
1 
p(g) = Po [:0] E 
9(P) = 90 [:or 
(3.35) 
(3.36) 
where (Po, go) is a reference point somewhere on the demand curve. The slope of 
the demand curve is simply 
dp p(g) 
dg Eg (3.37) 
Equations (3.35) and (3.37) give us the description of market price as a function of 
total generation which we needed in order to solve equation (3.17), although as 
we shall soon see the result is not quite as simple as in the case of linear demand. 
Substituting (3.37) into (3.12) we get 
_ p 9 - k 
P=7r- ---
Eg J 
if-p p[g - k] 
EgJ 
EJ[if - p] = p[g - k] 
9 
_ -pk 
EJ[7r - p] - p = -
9 
-pk 
g= . EJ[if - p] - p 
We now substitute in (3.36) 
[ P]E pk go Po = EJ[P - if] + p 
E pkp~ 
gop = EJ[P - if] + p 
E kp~ 
gop . EJ[l _ 1!:] + 1 
p 
if kpE 
pE[EJ[l- -] + 1] = _0 
p 90 
[1 J] *E J-*E-l kpo 0 € P - € 7rp - - = 
go 
(3.38) 
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Equation (3.38) is simply a polynomial in p, and can be solved easily by a num-
ber of numerical methods, although not in closed form. This will tell us the equi-
librium market price for the given marginal costs and contract amounts, and from 
this we can easily determine individual generation levels. A similar polynomial 
in g could be derived, but since we have (3.38) we might just as well use this value 
of pin (3.36) to get g. 
(3.39) 
Substituting p and 9 into (3.37) we get 
~:Ip,; = ~, (3.40) 
We may calculate how much each company will generate using (3.12) to solve for 
* P - 7r' 
gj = ~I : + kj 
dgj P=P 
* P - 7rj 
= • + kj 
1!.... 
. 
og 
(3.41) 
As with the linear case, we now present an example. Consider the case of two 
firms j = {I) 2} with marginal costs of 7rl = 1.5 and 7r2 2.5, and contract obli-
gations of kl 800 and k2 = 1200 with demand curve parameters Po = 3, t: = -~ 
and go 2000. These values are the same as in the example for the linear demand 
curve, with € chosen to give the same slope at the reference point (go) Po). Hence 
we have: 
1=2 
1.5 + 2.5 
if=---
2 
= 2.0 
k = 800+ 1200 
= 2000. 
(3.42) 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
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Substituting these values into (3.38) gives us a value for the market price 
[ 
3 1 *-! 3 *-!-1 2000 x 3-! l--x2p --x2x2xp - =0 
2 2 2000 
which gives 
* p = 2.26 
We can now substitute this value into (3.36) to calculate 9 
* 9 = 3057 
To calculate the generation for each company,), we use (3.41): 
91 = 2343 
92 = 714 
(3.45) 
(3.46) 
(3.47) 
(3.48) 
(3.49) 
(3.50) 
These results are illustrated in Figure 3.3. Note again the features we observed in 
Figure 3.2, namely that output lies between perfect competition output and con-
tract amount. 
In this section we have derived the Coumot equilibrium conditions for a mar-
ket with J firms of infinite size, where each firm has some contract commitment, 
kj, constant marginal costs, 7rj, and the industry demand can be described by a 
constant elasticity demand curve. 
3.9 Changing Marginal Costs, and Admissible Solu-
tions. 
We now return to the problem of how to proceed when the marginal cost is a func-
tion of the generation level. Assume that each firm's marginal cost curve is an ar-
bitrary monotone step curve of the form shown in Figure 3.1. This curve may be 
partitioned into ranges of generation over which the marginal cost is constant (the 
horizontal sections of the marginal cost curve) and ranges of marginal cost over 
which the generation is constant (the vertical steps of the marginal cost curve). 
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Figure 3.3: Market equilibrium with constant elasticity of demand. 
Generation Marginal Cost 
9 0 o < 1T < 1.0 
0< 9 < 100 11" = 1.0 
9 100 1.0 < 11" < 2.0 
100 < 9 < 250 11" 2.0 
9 = 250 2.0 < 11" < 4.0 
250 < 9 < 350 11" 4.0 
9 = 350 4.0 < 1T < 6.0 
350 < 9 < 650 11" 6.0 
9 = 650 6.0 < 1T < 7.0 
650 < 9 < 750 11" 7.0 
9 750 7.0 < 1T < 50.0 
Table 3.2: Separation of marginal cost function shown in Figure 3.1. 
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These regions will together they will completely describe the marginal cost curve. 
Table 3.2 illustrates this for the marginal cost function of Figure 3.l. 
We have shown in the previous sections how to find a solution for a fixed marginal 
cost, and we may use those methods for each of these regions. However the equi-
librium generation level for a particular marginal cost may fall outside the range 
of generation implied by this marginal cost, in which case we say that the solution 
is not admissible. Our hope is that there will be at least (and preferably exactly) 
one admissible solution over all the regions. 
At this point we will return to the example of § 3.7, except we will now replace 
the fixed value of 7r1 by the range of values described in Table 3.2. All other values 
will remain the same as before, including 7r2. 
First as an illustration we present the results for a region where 7r1 is a constant. 
For the second region, where 7r1 = 1.0, the values are: 
and 
J= 2, 
if = 1.75, 
k = 2000, 
* 8500 
g= -3-' 
* 13 
P=6' 
5900 
g1 = -3-' 
2600 
g2=--3 . 
Note that g1 = 59300 > 100, so this solution is inadmissible. 
(3.51) 
(3.52) 
(3.53) 
(3.54) 
(3.55) 
(3.56) 
(3.57) 
The procedure for the regions where the generation is fixed, but the marginal 
cost may vary is similar, although not identical. Since the generation for one firm 
is fixed, regardless of the market price, we may simply subtract this amount from 
the market demand at all prices. Thus the demand curve is shifted to the left by 
the amount of fixed generation. Hence we replace go by go - r, where r is the total 
amount of fixed generation (over all firms whose generation is fixed). Equation 
(3.19) now becomes 
p(g) = Po + p[g - go + r], (3.58) 
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and similarly we have 
:;r J' PoJ + pJ'[90 - r] + pk 9 = ----,---------=------c------=--
prj! + 1] (3.59) 
* Po + :;r J' + pk - p[go - r] 
P = J' + 1 ) (3.60) 
and 
7rj - Po - :;rJ' pk + p[go - f][J' + 1] 
9j = kj + [] P J! + 1 (3.61) 
Note that we have replaced J by J', which we define to be the number of compa-
nies whose generation is free to vary. That is, only J' firms are actively competing 
over this region. Similarly we define :;r' and k'. 
For the first region, then, where 9 = 0, the calculations are: 
J' 1, (3.62) 
:;r' = 2.5, (3.63) 
k' = 1200, (3.64) 
f=O, (3.65) 
9 1850, (3.66) 
* P = 3.15, (3.67) 
91 = 0 (3.68) 
and 
92 = 1850 (3.69) 
Note that 9 g2, as expected. The question we must ask now, is whether or not 
this is an admissible solution. Does it correspond to a marginal cost 0 < 7r1 < 1.0? 
If we substitute in the values of p = 3.15,91 = 0, kl = 800 and * = -10-3 into 
(3.12), we have 
71"1 = 3.15 - 10-3 X [0 - 800] 
=3.95 (3.70) 
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Generation Marginal Cost * Admissible? gl g2 7rl P 
g 0 0< 7rl < 1.0 0 1850 3.95 3.15 no 
0< g < 100 7rl = 1.0 1967 867 1.0 2.167 no 
g = 100 1.0 < 7rl < 2.0 100 1800 3.8 3.1 no 
100 < g < 250 7rl = 2.0 1300 1200 2.0 2.5 no 
g = 250 2.0 < 7rl < 4.0 250 1725 3.575 3.025 yes 
250 < g < 350 7rl = 4.0 -33 1867 4.0 3.167 no 
g = 350 4.0 < 7rl < 6.0 350 1675 3.425 2.975 . no 
350 < g < 650 7rl = 6.0 -1367 2533 6.0 3.834 no 
g c650 6.0 < 7rl < 7.0 650 1525 2.975 2.825 no 
650 < g < 750 7rl = 7.0 -2033 2867 7.0 4.167 no 
g = 750 7.0 < 7rl < 50.0 750 1475 2.825 4.275 no 
Table 3.3: Generation levels and market price for various regions in Finn One's marginal cost func-
tion. 
which is outside the allowable range of 0 < 7rl < 1.0, so this solution is not admis-
sible. 
Table 3.3 summarises these calculations for all the regions. The columns la-
belled gl and 7rl are reproduced in graphical form in Figure 3.4. The plus signs 
represent the response for a fixed marginal cost (horizontal sections of the supply 
curve). The asterisks represent the response for a fixed output (vertical sections of 
supply curve). Observe that the points are co-linear. The slope of the line can be 
found by differentiating (3.25) to get: 
dgj J 
d7rj p[J+l] (3.71) 
In the case of the example, with p = _10-3 and J = 2, ~ = 20~O. For a point 
] 
to be an admissible solution it must be on the supply curve for the firmlO. For a 
non-decreasing marginal cost curve, and a non-increasing response curve, as we 
have, it is obvious, graphically at least, that there will be at most one point of in-
tersection 11 • 
lOEach of the points was evaluated either with a marginal cost corresponding to a horizontal 
section of the supply curve, or with an output corresponding to a vertical section. For the point to 
be admissible it must fall on the corresponding section of the supply curve. 
ll1his is not suffiCient for a proof of uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In terms of § 3.9.1 we 
have a unique response for a particular value of the other firm's output, giving a single point on 
the reaction function. That is, the reaction function is a one to one mapping. 
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Figure 3.4: Finn One supply curve and generation levels for a range of marginal costs and produc-
tion levels. 
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As we had hoped, there is exactly one admissible solution, that being gl = 250, 
g2 = 1725, 7r1 = 3.575, 7r2 = 2.5, 9 = 1975, and p 3.025. In practice it is not only 
Firm One which has a marginal cost that varies with generation, so we must con-
struct n-dimensional tables similar to Table 3.3. We must now ask ourselves under 
what conditions will this there be exactly one admissible solution. This is consid-
ered in the next section. Note that the proofs of the following section are based on 
the idea of reaction functions, and to find the market equilibrium via the meth-
ods suggested there would require the construction of separate reaction functions 
for each step in the marginal cost functions. That would be a prohibitively expen-
sive process, and the methods of this section are a simplification of that process. 
In our implementation, rather than requiring a complete set of reaction functions 
we more simply have calculated the intersections of pairs (j-tuplets) of reaction 
functions. We then examined these for admissible solutions. 
3.9.1 Uniqueness of Solution (Linear Demand) 
If we assume, as in the previous section, that the marginal cost function, 7r(g), can 
be split into regions of constant marginal cost, or of constant generation, then there 
will be a single Coumot equilibrium for the market. Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 for-
malise this for linear demand. Theorem 3.1 gives us the result that for non-decreasing 
marginal costs there will be a unique equilibrium. Theorem 3.2 extends this re-
sult to cover step-wise marginal cost curves, as we require. Constant elasticity de-
mand is considered in § 3.9.2. The analysis is based on (Tirole 1988), but in our case 
the profit functions include contracts. The contracts have little effect for the case 
of linear demand, but do add some complications in the following section where 
we consider constant elasticity of demand. The proof uses the concept of reaction 
functions for the firms. A firm's reaction function, R, simply describes its best re-
sponse to the strategies of the other players. An example is shown in Figure 3.5. It 
is usual to plot the reaction functions for both players on the same axes, but note 
that for one of the players the axes are transposed, with the independent variable 
on the vertical axis. 
Theorem 3.1. Consider the J firm Cournot market with profit functions 
(3.72) 
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where p(g) is the inverse demand curve defining the market price for given levels of gen-
eration, and and Xj(gj) represents the production cost. If 
J 
p(g) = Po + p[-go + L gn] (3.73) 
n=l 
where p, Po and go are constants, and Xj(gj) is twice continuously differentiable, with 
~ > 0 and ~:;4 ~ 0, and g ~ 0 then there is a unique Cournot equilibrium vector 
of generation levels, g. 
Although a more simple proof is possible by showing that there is only one real 
valued solution to the first order optimality condition, we use the method sug-
gested in (Tirole 1988). Our reason is that this method will allow us to prove a 
similar theorem for constant elasticity of demand in the next section, where the 
former method could not be used. 
Proof The first derivative of Zj (g) with respect to gj is: 
(3.74) 
(3.75) 
The first order condition that Zj (g) is maximised is that 
dz-
J - 0 
-d - . gj (3.76) 
Assume we have some vector, g, of generation levels such that (3.76) is satisfied. 
That is/ Firm j has chosen a generation level gj as its best reaction to the generation 
levels of all other firms, g \ gj. Consider now what would happen if Firm i shifted 
its generation by some small amount, 6i . This would lead to a change in the LHS 
of (3.76) of Oid:;~~i. Firm j would be induced to make a small change/ -OJ/ to its 
own generation12 in order to rebalance 3.76. Thus we would have that 
(3.77) 
12The negative sign indicates that the changes in generation are in opposing directions. 
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or 
(3.78) 
Equation 3.78 describes the change in gj for a change in gi, from a particular point 
g. It may be rearranged to give a partial derivative ~, i.e. the slope of Firm j's 
reaction function. According to (Tirole 1988) a sufficient condition for there to be 
only one equilibrium is that whenever the reaction curves intercept the absolute 
value of each of their slopes be less than one. (In Tirole's terminology IR'I < 1.) 
Now 
(3.79) 
and 
(3.80) 
so 
(3.81) 
and, since by assUlllption :;j\ ~ O,and p < 0, 
IRfl < 1. (3.82) 
Since the absolute value of the slope of the reaction function is everywhere less 
than one we have, by Tirole's argument, precisely one Cournot equilibriurn13 . 
D 
Note that Theorem 3.1 does not rule out the possibility that we have UItique equi-
libria for other marginal cost functions where Xj (gj) is not twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, as our proof gives sufficient conditions only. 
13It is conceivable that the reaction functions might not intersect at all, if for example one firm's 
monopoly output were sufficient that the other firm would not produce anything. In such a case 
we still have a tmique solution, that of the monopoly output. By our requirement that output be 
non-negative, the reaction functions will always intersect, even in the case just described. 
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Figure 3.5: Reaction functions for two firms with l~ear demand. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the reaction functions for the example case of two firms 
j = {I, 2} with marginal costs of 11"1 = 1.5 and 11"2 = 2.5, and contract obligations 
of kl = 800 and k2 = 1200 with demand curve parameters Po = 3, p = -10-3 and 
go = 2000. As we obtained earlier in § 3.7, the equilibrium point is where g1 = 49300 
and g2 = 313
00
• 
Theorem 3.1 considers firms whose marginal costs are non-decreasing, and if 
increasing they increase at an increasing rate. The situation we wish to study is 
where the marginal cost function can be represented by a step curve, such as Fig-
ure 3.1. One approach to modelling this is to construct a separate reaction function 
for each section of our marginal cost curve, and to switch from one to the next 
as the stations become fully utilised. Since we always produce less with higher 
marginal costs than with lower ones, the reaction functions for higher marginal 
costs will be closer to the origin than those for low marginal costs, and the lines 
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Figure 3.6: Composite reaction functions for two firms with linear demand. 
joining the reaction functions will have slope of zero, so Tirole's condition will be 
satisfied. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6 for the example case of two firms j = 
{1, 2} with marginal costs of 1fl = 1.5 for gl < 700 and 1fl = 3.5 for gl > 700, 
1f2 = 2.5 for g2 < 1000 and 1f2 = 5 for g2 > 1000, contract obligations of kl = 800 
and k2 = 1200, and demand curve parameters Po = 3, p = -10-3 and go = 2000. 
The equilibrium point is now where gl = 700 and g2 = 1000. Note that for the 
higher marginal cost of 5 there is no generation level g2 > 1000, and hence the 
composite reaction curve for Firm Two is capped at 1000. 
Theorem 3.2. Consider the J firm Cournot market with profit functions 
(3.83) 
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where p(g) is inverse demand curve defining the market price for given levels of genera-
tion, and and Xj(gj) represents the production cost. If 
J 
p(g) = Po + p[-go + 2: gn] (3.84) 
n=l 
where p, Po and go are constants, and Xj (gj) is a non-decreasing piece-wise linear function, 
then there is a unique Cournot equilibrium vector of generation levels, g. 
Proof. d~~;) is either horizontal (constant marginal cost, increasing production) or 
vertical (increasing marginal cost, constant production). For the horizontal sec-
tions the situation is covered by Theorem 3.1. Each horizontal section corresponds 
to a different reaction function for Firm j, with higher marginal cost impl ying lower 
output. (Note that :;:z has a negative coefficient in (3.79n At the break points 
-in the marginal cost curve we move from one reaction function to the next, keep-
ing output constant. This corresponds to a horizontal line joining the two reaction 
functions. 
The combined reaction function is now a combination of sections which by 
Theorem 3.1 have I R'I < 1, and horizontal sections joining reaction functions, with 
IR'I = O. Tirole's condition is everywhere satisfied, so there is exactly one equilib-
rium14. D 
3.9.2 Uniqueness of Solution (Constant Elasticity Demand) 
This section follows § 3.9.1, only now we consider constant elasticity demand curves. 
We will place the restriction on the demand curves that the elasticity must be be-
tween zero and minus one. This is not unrealistic (see § 4.4.1). 
Theorem 3.3. Consider the J firm Cournot market with profit functions 
(3.85) 
14Strictly speaking, the slope of the reaction function at the corner points of the step curve is not 
defiited. However we can look at the limiting values approaching the corners from either direction 
to determine bounds. Since these limits are the two cases of IR'I < 1 and IR'I = 0 the condition is 
still satisfied. 
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where p(g) is inverse demand curve defining the market price for given non-negative levels 
of generation, and and Xj (gj) represents the production cost. If 
1 
( ) - [L;=1 gn] ~ p g -Po go (3.86) 
where E, Po and go are constants, Xj(gj) = 7rjgjfor some positive constant, 7rj, and Rj -1 (0) > 
Ri(O) gin (firm i's output that induces firm j to produce nothing exceeds firm i's monopoly 
OUtput15 ),.then there is a unique Cournot equilibrium vector of positive generation levels, 
g. 
Our proof follows that for Theorem 3.1. 
Proof The first derivative of Zj (g) is: 
dZj = &p [gj _ kj] + p(g) _ dXj dgj &gj dgj 
= p)g) [gj kj] + p(g) - 7r 
E Ln::::J gn 
(3.87) 
As before we can find the slope of the reaction function by implicit differenti-
ation: 
R'= 
&2p &p 
& d [gj kj ] + -;:) gi ,gj ugj 
p(g) [[gj - kj] [1 - E] + E L~::::1 gn] 
[E L~=l gnP 
&2p &p 
£:)2 [gj - kj ] + 2-;:) 
ugj ugj 
p(g) [rgj - kj] [1 - E] + 2E L~=l gn] 
[cL~=l gnP 
p(g) Ugi -kj j[l-c]+c L~-l gn] 
[e L:-1 9nP 
p(g) [[9rkj][1-c]+2e L~-l 9n] 
[c L~=l gnP 
[1 - E] [gj - kj] + E L~=l gn 
[1 E] [gj - kj] + 2E L;=1 gn 
(3.88) 
(3.89) 
(3.90) 
(3.91) 
(3.92) 
(3.93) 
15 Actually our requirement of non-negative output is sufficient for this. In that case we will have some 
output level of finn i, greater than or equal to their monopoly output that will induce finn j to produce 
nothing. 
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If the numerator of (3.93) is negative then -1 < RI < 0, and Tirole's condi-
tion is satisfied. However for gj > [1 - E] kj - E Ln:f:j gn this does not hold, and RI 
may become positive, and greater than one. However, for this case the reaction 
functions are always concave in the other player's output (recall that RI = *+): 
-E [[1- E] [gj - kj ] + 2EL~=1 gn] + 2E [[1- E] [gj - kj ] + EL~=l gn] 
[ . J] 2 [1 - E.I [gj - kj ] + 2E L n=l gn 
E [1 - E] [gj - kj ] 
(3.94) 
(3.95) 
(3.96) 
The denominator of (3.96) is a square, and so is positive. The elasticity of demand, 
E, is negative, and the generation and contracts are non-negative, so as long as 
gj > kj, the numerator is negative. Since we are only concerned with the region 
where gj > [1 - E] kj - E Ln:f:j gn, we certainly have that gj > kj , and the numera-
tor, and hence the whole expression is negative. This means that the slope of RI is 
always decreasing, and hence RI is concave16 (for the region where its slope may 
be positive). 
We already know that R( 0) 2: 0 (monopoly outputis non-negative) and R( x) = 
o for some sufficiently large x (if the market is saturated we will produce nothing). 
Thus the reaction function intercepts with both axes. We also have that the slope 
of RI is always decreasing, but it is never less than minus one. 
For two concave reaction functions to intercept with each other more than once 
we need either that at least one of the reaction functions does not intercept with 
both (positive) axes, or that at least one has a slope more negative than minus one. 
These two situations are illustrated in Figure 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. Neither of 
these situations apply, hence we have no more than one equilibrium point. Also, 
since by assumption Rj -1(0) > .R(O) the curves must intercept at least once, and 
we must have exactly one equilibrium point. 0 
16What this means is that the curve carmot tum back on itself to intersect with the other reaction 
function again. See Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.7: Reaction functions not touching both positive axes. 
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Figure 3.8: One reaction function with RI < -1 
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Figure 3.9: Reaction functions with constant elasticity of demand. 
Figure 3.9 illustrates the reaction functions for the example case of two firms 
j ;::.... {I, 2} with marginal costs of 1fl = 1.5 and 7f2 = 2.5, and contract obligations 
of kl = 800 and k2 = 1200 with demand curve parameters Po = 3, E = -~ and 
90 = 2000. The equilibrium point is where 91 = 1052 and 92 = 1135. 
Theorem 3.3 considers firms whose marginal costs constant. Again the situa-
tion we wish to study is where the marginal cost function can be represented by 
a step curve, such as Figure 3.1. As before, we model this by constructing a sep-
arate reaction function for each section of our marginal cost curve, and switching 
from one to the next as the stations become hIlly utilised. The reaction functions 
for higher marginal costs will be closer to the origin than those for low marginal 
costs, and the lines joining the reaction functions will have slope of zero, so Tirole's 
condition will be satisfied. This is illustrated in Figure 3.10 for the example case 
of two firms j = {I, 2} with marginal costs of 1f1 = 1.5 for 91 < 700 and 7fl = 3.5 
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Figure 3.10: Composite reaction functions with constant elasticity of demand. 
for gl > 700,1[2 = 2.5 for g2 < 1000 and 11"2 = 5 for g2 > 1000, contract obligations 
of kl 800 and k2 1200, and demand curve parameters Po = 3, € -l and 
go 2000. The equilibrium point is now where 91 847 and g2 1003. 
Theorem 3.4. Consider the J firm Cournot market with profit functions 
(3.97) 
where p(g) is inverse demand curve defining the market price for given levels of genera-
tion, and and Xj (gj) represents the production cost. If 
1 ( ) . [I:~=l gn] € p g =po 
90 
(3.98) 
where f, Po and 90 are constants, Xj(gj) is a non-decreasing step junction, and Rj -1 (0) > 
~(O) = gf' (firm i's output that induces firm j to produce nothing exceeds firm oi's monopoly 
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output), then there is a unique Cournot equilibrium vector of positive generation levels, 
g. 
Proof The proof follows that of Theorem 3.2. o 
3.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a Coumot model of an electricity spot market. The 
existence of unique equilibria has been proved for both linear and constant elas-
ticity demand functions for the situation where each of the firms has a monotone 
stepped marginal cost function. An efficient technique has been presented for lo-
cating this equilibrium point, and it is this technique which we use in our com-
puter models. Some results and observations based on this single period model 
are presented in the following chapter. Chapter 5 discusses how we integrate this 
single period model into the multi-period model used for reservoir management. 
Chapter 4 
Single Period Behaviour 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we consider the behaviour of electricity companies within some 
single period such as a half hour, or perhaps one sub-period of a LDC. We derive 
what we term market response curves (MRC) which describe how much the firms 
would offer to the market for a range of demand curves. These are similar to the 
traditional supply curve, although each point on the MRC is derived under dif-
ferent assumptions about the market demand curve. 
We consider both linear and constant elasticity demand curves, with a range 
of elasticities, and a range of contract levels. We also compare results for wet and 
dry years, and consider the effect that the structure of the firms has on the MRC. 
Finally we consider the situation where one of firms behaves as a perfect com-
petitor, assuming it cannot affect the market price. 
4.2 Market Response Curves 
Klemperer & Meyer (1989) presented a model in which firms offer a supply curve 
to the market. At least for the implementations put forward by Green & New-
bery (1992) and by Powell (1993), this has implied a single supply curve bid for 
the whole day. As discussed earlier, (Chapter 2), requiring a single supply curve 
to represent the responses to range of demands throughout the day is likely to 
introduce extra distortions. In the particular case of a hydro river chain, where 
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marginal costs may well vary considerably throughout the day, a single supply 
curve may just not make sense. Our approach to this problem has been to model a 
separate Coumot game in each of several sub-periods throughout the dayl. Within 
our single period model we determine the equilibria for each of the sub-periods, 
and combine these to give a total generation and average spot price for the period. 
In this Chapter, where we are interested in the market behaviour within a single 
time period, we use what we term Market Response Curves (MRCs) to show how 
the firms react to a range of demand curves. In many senses this may be thought of 
as an industry supply curve for the period, but it is really the Coumot equilibrium 
locus for a range of demand curves. In practice we have generated each point on 
the MRC by solving for the Coumot Nash equilibrium for each of a range of de-
mand curves. This gives a price-quantity pair for each demand leveF. A supply 
curve would give a quantity for a range of prices3 . 
4.3 The Base Case 
We begin with what we will refer to as the base case, w34, which is based on win-
ter demand that would have been experienced'in 1993 with the inflows that were 
experienced in 1934. For a start, we consider the breakup option we refer to as 
ee2, with stations allocated as described in Table 4.1. An interesting feature of this 
breakup option is that Firm One has both the major hydro capacity, and Huntly, 
which in practice is very often the marginal station in the NZ system. It has been 
suggested that keeping these assets together would enable the correct tradeoffs 
to be made between the hydro and Huntly, regardless of the practicalities of the 
market. If that is indeed the case, then we might well expect to see the operation 
lIn our implementation we usually consider the LDC to represent a week rather than a single 
day, but the principle is still the same. 
2If we refer back to (3.75) we can see that while Po has a positive coefficient, gj has a negative 
one. If we are to keep (3.76) in balance, then an increase in Po must be balanced by an increase 
in gj. This means that our MRCs (which we construct by moving through an increasing series of 
demand curves, i.e. increasing Po) will be monotonic-increasing. 
3It is interesting to note that a subset of the points from the MRC do not form an optimal sup-
ply function to offer to the market for the period, in the sense of Klemperer & Meyer (1989). Each 
point is the solution to a distinct Cournot game, and as both Klemperer & Meyer (1989) and Green 
& Newbery (1992) state, a supply finction will only cross the Coumot line, once if at all. Our MRC, 
composed of many Cournot solutions, cannot be an equilibrium supply function. A supply func-
tion would be in response to a particular game, not a series of different games. 
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Station(s) Capacity Marginal Cost i Owner 
Waitaki and 
Waikato4 2455 2.0 Firm 1 
Huntly 900 2.0 Firm 1 
New Plymouth 518 2.5 Firm 2 
Stratford 178 3.5 Firm 2 
Marsden A 103 6.0 Firm 2 
Otahuhu 81 11.0 Firm 2 
Whirinaki 194 15.0 Firm 2 
Clutha5 244 0.0 Firm 2 
i Manapouri6 570 0.0 Firm 1 
Table 4.1: Break-up option ee2. 
under the ec2 option to be closer to the perfectly competitive outcome than other 
-options where this feature is absent. 
4.3.1 How We Define Contracts 
Before presenting the example results, we must first explain some of our notation. 
In what follows we will refer to two types of contracts, two-way options and one-way 
options, commonly known as call options. We will typically refer to the former as 
the level of contracting, and to the latter as the level of backup. Where this dis-
tinction is not obvious more precise terms will be used. 
We typically define the level of contracting as a percentage of the load that the 
firm would be expected to generate under Pc. The contracts are set as a percentage 
of that expected generation leveL We commonly use the term fully contracted to 
mean that a firm has sold contracts for exactly 100% of its expected PC generation6 • 
In our model the firms are allowed to buy backup contracts from each other, 
but not from the demand side or the Fringe7• These backup contracts transfer some 
SSince we only develop a single reservoir model in this thesis, the Waitaki and Waikato hydro 
systems are aggregated. 
sBoth Clutha and Manapouri are here modelled as run of river stations, with capacities set to 
their average winter output. 
6Hydro inflows, in particular, will cause a major variation of the actual PC levels in any given 
year: This means that 100% contracting based on a particular expected level will not exactly match 
the PC levels for any given year. 
70ne could easily construct a financially equivalent model where instead of having back-up 
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of a firm's obligation to the other firm if the spot price rises above the strike price. 
We have again defined these as a percentage, this time of the amount of backup re-
quired to return Firm Two to full contracting8• In our computational experiments 
we have defined back-up contracts with strike prices at each marginal fuel cost. 
4.4 Constant Elasticity Demand Curves 
In this section we assume that the market demand at a given moment can be de-
scribed by a constant elasticity demand curve. We begin by considering the case 
where the elasticity of demand is -~. 
Figure 4.1 shows the market response for the case where both firms are 100% 
contracted, and the level of backup is also 100%9. The market generation levels, 
marked with a +, fit closely to the step curve that is the PC supply curve (the marginal 
cost curvelO). The reason for this is simple: at each point the contracts match the 
PC generation level exactly. The lower graph in these figures shows the division 
between the two firms. With no back-up, each firm's generation is non-decreasing 
with increasing total generation. 
Compare this with Figure 4.2 where the firms are both only 50% contracted, 
and there is no backup. Here we see a significant move away from the PC levels, 
with the spot price being between 20 and 50% higher than Pc. The reason for this 
shift is clear if we look back to (3.12) which tells us that the market level will lie 
somewhere between the PC level and the contract level. 
Such a shift is extreme, to say the least, but it also seems unlikely in light of both 
overseas experience (Green & Newbery 1992, Wiedswang 1993), and the current 
contracts with another firnl, the firms had one way contracts with the consumers, and the con-
sumers bought contracts from one finn for up to a certain price, and from the other firm for above 
that price. 
8This was a somewhat arbitrary choice, to base back-up contracts on the idea of returning Finn 
Two to full contracting. Our motivation was the idea that the hydro stations would buy back-
up from the thermal stations to cover themselves for inflow variations. A more accurate scheme 
would be to enter contracts as actual quantities rather than percentages, but in the absence of re-
alistic data on contracting we chose to work with percentages. This does have the advantage that 
it better enables comparison across models and market structures. 
9Note that backup is still required since the contracts for Finn One were based on the expected 
hydro generation which, depending upon the inflow, will probably not be the actual capacity. 
10 As we discuss later in this Chapter, it is arguable that short nm marginal cost data is not appro-
priate for use in the simulation model, just as short run demand elasticity may not be appropriate. 
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Figure 4.1: Market Response Curve and individual generation for base case, both Firms 100% con-
tracted, full backup. 
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Market Response Curve, ec2w34909000 
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Figure 4.3: Market Response Curve and individual generation, both Firms 90% contracted, no 
backup. 
situation in New Zealand, where long term contracts have been offered up for to 
87% of the dry year capacityll. A more likely scenario is that shown in Figure 4.3 
where the firms are both 90% contracted, although there is no backup. The MRC is 
much closer to the PC curve, although the spot price is at times up to 25% higher 
than Pc. Note that this does not imply a 25% rise in electricity bills for the con-
sumers, as the 25% is only on the 10% of demand that isn't contracted12 . 
The effect of backup contracts is not always positive, as can be seen when we 
compare Figure 4.2 with Figure 4.4, the latter having 100% backup. Not only is 
there a clear shift in the response curve, but also the lower graph shows there is a 
significant change in the relative outputs of the two firms, with Firm Two taking 
on more of the generation as they face greater contracts via the backup arrange-
ments they have offered Firm One. The perhaps counter-intuitive13 thing about 
llThis is for ECNZ. The contracts for Contact, ECNZ's main competitor are not public 
knowledge. 
12 As mentioned in footnote 14 the contract price may reasonably be expected to con verge on the 
long run average spot price. 
13The purpose of the back-up contracts is to restore merit order in production, that is, to im-
prove production efficiency. The downside of this is in allocative efficiency. The back-up contracts 
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Figure 4.4: Market Response Curve and individual generation, both Firms 50% contracted, 100% 
backup. 
this comparison is that in the situation where there is greater backup, prices are 
higher and output is lower. The explanation is simple. Firm One is the domi-
nant firm, with 3925 MW compared with 1318 MW in Firm Two. Firm One has 
only low merit order stations, so as the price rises, the back-up contracts will be 
transferring the contract obligations away from Firm One, to Firm Two. Hence the 
dominant firm is now more lightly contracted, and will act more strongly to push 
the spot price up. Firm two will act against this, as they are now more heavily 
contracted, but being the smaller firm they have less influence, and the spot price 
will inevitably rise. 
Higher back-up does not always imply lower distortion, rather appropriate 
back-up can reduce distortion. This is largely a matter of definition. We have 
defined 100% back-up as the amount required to adjust Firm Two's contracts to 
the amount they would expect to generate under Pc. With this definition when 
both firms are 50% contracted 100% back-up implies an unrealistic level, in that 
have an effect not unlike that of collusion, increasing the monopoly powers of the suppliers, and 
re-allocating wealth from consumers to suppliers. It is this effect on allocative efficiency that we 
observe here. 
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Figure 4.5: Market Response Curve and individual generation, Firm One 50% contracted, Firm 
Two 100% contracted, no backup. 
it returns Firm Two to 100% contracting, when their intention was only to be 50% 
contracted. Full back-up in this instance would perhaps be more appropriately be 
defined as the level which would return Firm Two to 50% of their PC production. 
To further illustrate this idea of market power, consider Figure 4.5 where Firm 
One is 50% contracted, and Firm Two is 100% contracted, with no back-up. The 
response curve shows significantly higher prices and lower quantities than the PC 
levels, for all levels of demand. Compare this to Figure 4.6 in which we have the 
reverse situation, with Firm One 100% contracted, and Firm Two 50% contracted, 
again with no back-:-up. Here the response curve is very close to the PC curve at 
all levels of demand. There are two reasons for the differences. 
The first is to do with the overall level of contracting in the market. Recall that 
Firm One is much larger than Firm Two, and so 50% of Firm One's contracts is a 
much greater amount than 50% of Firm Two's. The overall level of contracting is 
then much greater in Figure 4.6 than in Figure 4.5, and so the market response is 
much closer to pC. 
The second reason is to do with market power at different demand levels. Since 
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Figure 4.6: Market Response Curve and individual generation, Firm One 100% contracted, Finn 
Two 50% contracted, no backup. 
Firm One has the large, low merit order stations, it can influence the market at 
all levels of demand. Firm Two, on the other hand, has the high merit order sta-
tions, and cannot influence the spot market at low prices without suffering sub-
stantial marginal (financial) losses. This is further illustrated if we look at Fig-
ure 4.7, which is similar to Figure 4.5, except that the marginal cost of hydro is 
set to 10 cents, which places it much higher up the merit order. This situation 
could well occur in a dry year, for example, when the marginal water value would 
be substantially higher. The result is rather interesting, with the market response 
curve now having sections both under and over the PC levels. 
Alternatively, we can consider a different breakup option which we call ww, 
as described in Table 4.2. This option has Firm One owning just the major hydro 
storage reservoirs, Waitaki and Waikato. Firm Two owns Huntly, the major ther-
mal station at 2 cents, and Clutha and Manapouri are owned by the Fringe. Fig-
ure 4.8 is similar to Figure 4.5, but for this ww breakup option. The MRC is much 
closer to PC since Firm Two can now influence the spot price at relatively low lev-
els of output. This may seem contrary to the expectations that having Huntly in 
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Figure 4.7: Market Response Curve and individual generation, Firm One 50% contracted, Firm 
Two 100% contracted, no backup, marginal water value = 10. 
the same firm as the major hydro stations would encourage better coordination of 
Huntly and the hydro resources. However the real test of this is in the medium 
term :r;todel, where the marginal water value changes throughout the year. This 
is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
In this section we have demonstrated the major impact that contracts have on 
generation levels. Low levels of overall contracting lead to low levels of output, 
and high levels of contracting lead to high output. The effect of back-up contracts 
is to increase the coordination efficiency between the firms, but may be at some 
detriment to the allocative efficiency. That is, while the overall fuel cost for the 
market as a whole may be reduced, there may be some transfer of wealth from 
consumers to the producers, who will have greater market power as a result of 
the back-up contracts. We have shown how the portfolio of plant that a supplier 
holds influences their market power, and ultimately the level of price distortion in 
the spot market as a whole. It is worth noting that letting an under-contracted, low 
merit order company buy back-up may well increase the price distortions rather 
than reduce them. 
4.4. Constant Elasticity Demand Curves 
Station(s) Capacity Marginal Cost Owner. 
Waitaki and 
Waikato 2455 2.0 Firm 1 
Huntly 900 2.0 Firm 2 
New Plymouth 518 2.5 Firm 2 
Stratford 178 3.5 Firm 2 
Marsden A 103 6.0 Firm 2 
Otahuhu 81 11.0 Firm 2 
Whirinaki 194 15.0 Firm 2 
Clutha 244 0.0 Fringe 
Manapouri 570 0.0 Fringe 
Table 4.2: Break-up option ww. 
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Figure 4.8: Market Response Curve and individual generation for breakup option ww, Finn One 
50%·contracted, Firm Two 100% contracted, no backup. 
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4.4.1 Different Levels of Demand Elasticity 
A complication for a model such as ours is that it is not entirely clear whether we 
should be using short run or long run elasticities. In reality, while peoples' re-
sponse to price changes may be small in the short term, they will be greater in the 
medium term, with a change in usage patterns, and switching to alternative fuels. 
Ideally we would model this with a low short run elasticity and a higher medium 
term elasticity. In practice our model only lets us set one elasticity, so we compro-
mise with a value between the estimates for the short and medium term. We be-
lieve this is appropriate since the owners will undoubtedly have their focus on the 
mid-term and long-term 14 response when playing this repeated game15• With that 
in mind, it is obviously important to consider the sensitivity of our results to the 
choice of elasticity, and that is what we concentrate on in this section. It should be 
kept in mind, though, when reading through this section, that the manager must 
ultimately make that compromise, and the elasticity would be ultimately chosen 
to give the most satisfactory results for the medium term simulation reported later. 
We will consider elasticities in the range from -0.1 to -0.8, which cover the ex-
tremes reported elsewhere (Borenstein & Bushnell 1997, Green & Newbery 1992). 
There is little point in presenting the results for the base case with full contracting, 
as the response curve will again exactly match the PC curve. Obviously the most 
dramatic changes will be for the cases where the distortion away from PC is the 
greatest, that is, extreme over or under contracting. But even for the case of both 
firms contracted at 90% and with no backup the MRC is quite sensitive to changes 
in elasticity. Figure 4.9, which is similar to Figure 4.3, shows the market response 
for demand elasticities of -0.1, -0.33 and -0.8. For the most extreme of these three 
cases, elasticity of -0.1, the response curve is about as far from PC as in Figure 4.2 
where the elasticity was -0.33, but the contracts were at 50%. 
From these results it is obvious that our model is indeed sensitive to changes 
in demand elasticity, and some caution should be used when deciding upon the 
14 A related issue, but one we do not consider in this Thesis is the idea that energy spot market 
prices will feed forward to future contract prices. Thus raising spot prices may well lead to even 
greater profits in the future aqs contract prices increase also. See also Batstone (1997). 
15The discerning owner will realise that while extra high profits may be made on any given day, 
such levels could not be sustained without either enticing new entry or encouragmg consumers 
to find substitutes for electricity. 
4.5. Linear Demand Curves 69 
Market Response Curve, ec2w34909000 
20,------,-------.------,-------,------,---,,-, 
18 
16 
14 ................................................................ . 
12 
8 
6 .. 
4 
2 
OL-~~~~----~------~------~----~-------
o 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 
Generation 
Figure 4.9: Market Response Curve, both Firms 90% contracted, no backup. Elasticity of demand 
at -0.1 (+), -0.33 (0), and -0.8 (x). 
appropriate elasticity. 
4.5 Linear Demand Curves 
Here we assume that the market demand can be described by a linear demand 
curve, and look at the resulting equilibrium conditions. As with the previous sec-
tion we are interested in how sensitive our model is to the choice of demand curve. 
Figure 4.10 shows the MRC with the slope of the demand curves set to -1/500, 
with both firms 50% contracted, and no backup. This equates roughly to Figure 4.2. 
As we had hoped, our model produces similar results for the linear demand curves 
to those for the constant elasticity demand curves. Figure 4.11 shows the sensitiv-
ity of the model to change in slope of demand, similar to that shown for the con-
stant elasticity curves in Figure 4.9. However, for a given linear demand curve 
tangent to a constant elasticity demand curve the price will be lower at all levels 
except the tangent point. This is illustrated in Figure 4.12. 
Again the model is very sensitive to changes in the slope of the demand curve. 
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Figure 4.10: Market Response Curve and individual generation, both Firms 50% contracted, no 
backup. 
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Figure 4.12: Constant elasticity demand curve is always above the tangent linear demand curve. 
It seems that with appropriate choice of slope the results using linear demand 
curves are comparable with those using constant elasticity demand curves, espe-
cially if the equilibrium point is close to the reference point for the demand curve. 
However, as shown in Figure 4.12, the discrepancy becomes greater as the equilib-
'rium moves away from the reference point. When choosing between a linear and a 
constant elasticity representation we should, then, consider how close to our point 
estimates the equilibrium is likely to be. In terms of efficiency the linear demand 
curve allows closed form solution, whereas the constant elasticity demand curve 
requires solution by numerical methods. 
4.6 Summary Tables 
The following tables summarise the distortion in the market as measured by our 
Price Distortion Index (PDI). The PDI is defined as the ratio of the area under the 
MRC minus the area under the PC supply curve to the area tmder the PC supply 
curve. As examples, the PDI for Figure 4.1 is -0.01 and for Figure 4.2 is 2.13. For 
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any particular situation a better measure of the price distortion would probably be 
given by a weighted index, with weights based on the relevant LDC, but for gen-
eral comparisons of the sort we wish to make here this unweighted index seems 
more appropriate. A negative PDI simply implies that the MRC was lower than 
the PC supply curve. 
The tables emphasise the points made elsewhere in this chapter. In particular 
distortion is higher for lower levels of contracting, and for less elastic demand. 
Corresponding to each table is a graph, Figure 4.13-Figure 4.21, of the same data. 
In the graphs the PDI is plotted against the mean total level of contracting16 . 
While there is a clear trend in the graphs, showing the PDI decreases as the 
overall level of contracting increases, there are some irregularities17 . The explana-
tion for these is that we have used an imperfect measure of the total contracting 
level, namely the mean across the MRC. If we had plotted the graphs for a partic-
ular demand curve, rather than a range of demand curves, the trends would have 
been more obvious. However a single demand curve might not give as good a 
representation of the overall distortions in the market. 
It is clear from comparing Figure 4.13,Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 that there is . 
greater price distortion for the less elastic cases. It is not so clear cut as to the ef-
fect of back-up contracts as we have implemented them. While increasing back-up 
seems ~o have helped for high levels of contracting, it has had quite the opposite 
effect for low levels of contracting. But compare Figure 4.14 (no back -up) with Fig-
ure 4.20 (100% back-up). The rows across Figure 4.14 correspond with the rows of 
Table 4.4, where Firm One's contracts are constant, and Firm Two's are changing. 
16Recall that Finn One is roughly twice the size of Finn Two, and so 50% of Finn One's capacity 
is a rather different number to 50% of Finn Two's capacity. It seems more reasonable to expect the 
PDI to be correlated to the total contracting amount, rather than to a percentage of either finns' 
capacity. However the PDI is based on the MRC, which is plotted for a range of market demand 
levels, and a corresponding range of contract amounts. But just as we have condensed the distor-
tion measures into a single PDI, we have also condensed the range of contract amounts (all corre-
sponding to the same percentage, but of differing demands) into the mean contract amount. It is 
this value which we refer to as the mean total contract amount in the graphs. 
17Pigure 4.19 has some irregularities due to missing data. The missing data arose from the situ-
ation where the total contracting was sufficiently low that the back-up contracting resulted in one 
or the other company having a negative amount on contract. While there is nothing inherently 
incorrect about a negative contract amount, it would normally be expected from the demand side, 
not the supply side. Our program has not been set up to cope with this situation, as it does not 
really fall within the range of levels we expected to study. 
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Contracting Firm Two 
120% • Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 
50% 56.87 36.68 23.13 17.64 14.57 12.77 11.63 10.87 
60% 20.41 14.91 10.41 8.26 6.94 6.16 5.57 5.20 
70% 8.76 7.01 5.36 4.33 3.69 3.24 2.92 2.67 
80% 4.22 3.47 2.95 2.41 2.04 1.78 1.58 1.44 
90% 2.05 1.74 1.47 1.26 1.06 0.89 0.77 0.66 
100% 0.94 0.72 0.52 0.40 0.26 0.14 0.04 -0.04 
110% 0.39 0.23 0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.16 -0.22 -0.26 
120% 0.13 -0.01 -0.10 -0.16 -0.23 -0.30 -0.34 -0.38 
Table 4.3: PDL No back-up, elasticity of demand -0.1 
In Figure 4.20 these horizontal bands are absent, and there is a monotonic rela-
tionship between total contracting and PDI. It is the effect of the back-up contracts 
which produces the difference between the figures. In the case where there is no 
back-up the contracting of Firm One (the larger firm) has a much greater influence 
on the PDI than the contracting of Firm Two. When there is back-up, the contracts 
are re-allocated amongst the firms, and it is no longer important which firm sold 
the original contracts. If either firm increases contracting by a particular quantity, 
then the PDI will drop by the same amount. 
The message once again is that back-up is improving productive efficiency, but 
not necessarily allocative efficiency. When contracting is low, and monopoly power 
is correspondingly high, back-up increases market power, and increases price dis-
tortions. When contracting is high, and monopoly power correspondingly low, 
back-up increases productive efficiency and this reduces price distortion. 
4.7 The Monopolist vs the Perfect Competitor 
Let us now tum our attention to the situation where only one of the two firms is 
acting as an oligopolist, with the other being a price-taker, and generating when-
ever its marginal cost is less than the spot price, regardless of contract obligations. 
(Equivalently, each station is owned by separate price taker.) In these examples 
Firm One, the one controlling the hydro reservoirs, is the monopolist, and Firm 
Two is the Pc. 
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Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 2.13 2.14 2.08 1.94 1.84 1.75 1.68 1.60 
60% 1.50 1.41 1.41 1.40 1.34 1.27 1.21 1.16 
70% 0.84 0.80 0.74 0.71 0.61 0.52 0.43 0.40 
80% 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.31 0.24 0.19 0.16 
90% 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.03 
100% 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 
110% 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 
.120% 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 
Table 4.4: PDI. No back-up, elasticity of demand -0.3 
Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.26 0.23 0.22 
60% 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.15 
70% 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 
80% 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 n05 
90% 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 
100% 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
110% 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
120% 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
Table 4.5: PDI. No back-up, elasticity of demand -0.8 
Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 59.22 40.89 29.99 23.05 17.88 14.06 11.30 9.05 
60% 23.14 17.06 13.05 10.18 8.02 6.32 4.97 4.04 
70% 10.56 8.03 6.13 4.83 3.89 3.09 2.50 1.92 
80% 5.17 3.94 3.04 2.43 1.94 1.52 1.18 0.92 
90% 2.55 1.96 1.54 1.20 0.83 0.57 0.28 0.08 
100% 1.13 0.78 0.50 0.30 0.14 -0.01 -0.11 -0.18 
110% 0.37 0.22 0.10 -0.00 -0.09 -0.16 -0.22 -0.28 
120% 0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.14 -0.20 -0.26 -0.31 -0.35 
Table 4.6: PDI. 50% back-up, elasticity of demand -0.1 
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Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 2.38 2.12 1.95 1.81 1.66 1.52 1.38 1.27 
60% 1.76 1.62 1.43 1.28 1.09 0.87 0.66 0.51 
70% 1.10 0.89 0.73 0.61 0.51 0.41 0.32 0.23 
80% 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.04 -0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
90% 0.54 0.46 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.21 0.14 0.08 
90% 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.03 -0.01 
100% 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 
110% 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 
120% 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.13 
Table 4.7: PDI. 50% back-up, elasticity of demand -0.3 
Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.17 
60% 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.12 
70% 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.08 
80% 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 . 
90% 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.02 
100% 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
110% 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
120% 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
Table 4.8: PDI. 50% back-up, elasticity of demand -0.8 
Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 177.61 106.26 64.79 40.49 26.24 17.09 11.54 7.98 
60% 57.00 35.84 23.31 15.23 10.35 7.19 4.88 3.37 
70% 20.71 13.60 9.30 6.46 4.40 3.03 2.09 1.41 
80% 8.56 5.83 3.97 2.73 1.88 1.27 0.79 0.37 
90% 3.60 2.49 1.70 1.14 0.66 0.31 0.13 0.01 
100% 1.52 1.00 0.53 0.26 0.10 -0.01 -0.09 -0.15 
110% 0.43 0.21 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.17 -0.22 -0.26 
120% 0.03 -0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.23 -0.27 -0.30 -0.33 
Table 4.9: PDI. 100% back-up, elasticity of demand -0.1 
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Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 2.49 2.17 1.90 1.65 1.44 1.22 0.95 0.64 
60% 1.83 1.59 1.38 1.16 0.83 0.59 0.45 0.34 
70% 1.32 1.09 0.75 0.55 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.18 
80% 0.68 0.51 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.07 
90% 0.36 0.28 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.00 
100% 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
110% 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 
120% 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 
Table 4.10: PDI. 100% back-up, elasticity of demand -0.3 
Contracting Firm Two 
Firm One 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 
50% 0.47 0.41 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 
60% 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 
70% 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 
80% 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.05 
90% 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 
100% 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 
110% 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
120% 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
Table 4.11: PDI. 100% back-up, elasticity of demand -0.8 
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Figure 4.21: Price Distortion Index for a range of contract quantities. 100% back-up, elasticity of 
demand-O.S 
This creates an interesting situation where the monopolist can manipulate the 
market price so as to influence the PC generation. This will often mean pushing 
the price up to just below the next highest marginal cost in the Perfect Competi-
tor's merit order. It may also mean that the MRC will be non-monotone, and may 
even double back on itself, with market output decreasing with increasing price, 
as illustrated in the extreme case of Figure 4.22. It seems unlikely that an MRC 
such as that could be put forward to any spot market. The implications of this 
are that model we present is not entirely plausible under such circumstances. But 
note that for higher levels of contracting this is much less of a problem. 
For more realistic contracting levels of 90% in Figure 4.23 the curve is very 
nearly monotone, but is still notably different from that in Figure 4.3. In partic-
ular note the long flat section where the price is held just below Firm Two's 2.5 
cent station, New Plymouth. The individual generation tells the story as we see 
New Plymouth coming in fully when the price rises to 2.5 cents. Further up the 
merit order the MRC follows PC more closely than in Figure 4.3, as these are all 
small stations owned by Firm Two. 
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4.B. Condusions 83 
As can be seen, the PC has a significant moderating effect, putting a price cap 
in at each of its marginal costs. The oligopolist cannot push the price any higher 
than the next highest marginal cost of the PC without the PC coming in with more 
generation. However the non-monotone MRCs produced may lead to significant 
problems in modelling, with the possibility of higher demand leading to lower 
output, but at a higher price. For our purposes, what we will require is that Finn 
One's demand for water be monotonic-non-decreasing. Fortunately this may still 
be the case if the non-monotonicities in the MRC occur when the hydro stations 
are-running either fully on or fully off. This is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
4.8 Conclusions 
We have studied the market response tmder a range of assumptions including 
linear and constant elasticity demand curves of various slopes, different market 
break-up options and different behaviour assumptions. 
The level of contracting greatly influences the spot market, with higher lev-
els of contracting leading to lower prices and higher output. In a market with 
full back-up contracts the price distortion decreases monotonically with increas-
ing market contract quantities. With less than full back-up the price distortion still 
decreases with each firm's increasing contracts, but the larger firm has a much 
greater effect than the small finn. 
It is not only the total generating capacity, but also the portfolio of generat-
ing plant a company holds tllat influences their market power. Finns with low 
merit order plant are better able to influence the spot market. Hence letting an 
under-contracted, low merit order company buy back-up may well increase the 
price distortions rather than reduce them. 
The model is very sensitive to changes in the slope of the demand curves, a 
point worth noting if quantitative rather than qualitative observations are to be 
drawn. Steeper (less elastic) demand curves lead to higher price distortions, as is 
expected. Note that while price is very sensitive, quantities are less so, as can be 
observed in Chapter 6. 
The choice of using linear or constant elasticity demand curves seems on the 
face of it to be somewhat arbitraI1-" but as we noted earlier this depends on how 
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far from the reference point the equilibrium is expected to be. Solving for linear 
demand is simpler as we have a closed form solution where the constant elasticity 
demand requires numerical solution methods. Perhaps piece-wise linear demand 
would be a worthwhile compromise to investigate in future studies. 
The break-up option ec2 appears to have greater price distortions than the op-
tion ww. The distortion seems to be as a result of the imbalance between firms 
in ec2, with Firm One's capacity being nearly 4000 MW, all low merit order, com-
pared with Firm Two's 1300 MW, mostly high merit order. 
Finally, although having a PC in the market does have the desirable effect of 
moderating distortions somewhat, it may also lead to non-monotonicities in the 
MRC, and hence to troubles in modelling the medium term market behaviour. 
Chapter 5 
Managing Hydro Reservoirs Over 
Several Time Periods: Theory 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapters we have developed and tested a method for predicting 
spot prices and generation levels under a given set of conditions. One of the re-
quirements of our short run model (SRM) is that we have the marginal costs of 
generation for each of the stations, including the hydro,station. In order to calcu-
late the marginal water value (marginal cost of generating at the hydro station) we 
need to consider not only the current time period, but also all future time periods 
that the water may be used in. In this chapter we detail the procedure we use for 
calculating the marginal water value. Our method is iterative, and is based on a 
Dual variant of Dynamic Programming which we call Dual DP (DDP). 
5.2 DP and DDP 
In the standard (primal) DP approach to reservoir management, ignoring inflow 
correlation, the stages are time periods (weeks or months perhaps) and the state 
space is defined by the storage level of the reservoir. The storage level is divided 
up into some arbitrary grid of storage levels, and perhaps later this grid is refined, 
At each stage, t, we try to maximise the profit from release during the period plus 
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the value of water left in storage at the end of the period: 
(5.1) 
such that 
(5.2) 
wherev.tl(s;) is the value to firmj at the end of period t-1 of having s; units of 
water in storage-at the start of period t. The cost of generating gj units is c;(gj), and 
k; is the contract amount. The cost of generation is, strictly, a function of storage 
as well as generation, as indicated by the state transformation equation, (5.2). The 
DP approach is to recursively solve the state equation, (5.1) for all possible values 
of the state variable, s; (storage). The levels of storage considered are only those 
on the defined grid. In practice this maximisation problem may well be solved 
by setting the first derivative of (5.1) to zero, that is, equating marginal revenue 
with marginal costs. For each storage level there will be an associated price, that 
being the marginal cost (revenue). For our range of storage levels we will have 
a corresponding range of marginal values, and an important feature of the opti-
mal solution to our DP is that the storage trajectory will be such that the marginal 
values are equated from one period to the next1 . If this were not the case then we 
could achieve a better solution by carrying more water over from periods were it 
was of low value to periods where it was of high value. In Dual DP we make use 
of this feature to tum the problem around. 
The DDP approach is dual in that we consider the price rather than the stor-
age leveL The state space is defined by the marginal water value (price of water) 
and this is divided up into some grid. In the PC case this grid is defined at the 
critical marginal values at which the operating decision will change. These are 
the marginal costs of the thermal stations, since these determine which stations 
should be operating. Unfortunately in the market situation we are studying we 
must consider more than just these critical points as stations are no longer bid in 
at exactly their marginal costs, and there is a continuum of prices for which the 
IMarginal water values will be equated except when the reservoir is at one of its storage 
bounds. At that point the firm's marginal costs are still equated, but they now are made up of 
the marginal water value plus a multiplier on the storage constraint. 
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operating decision may change2• 
In DDP we ask at each stage what the required release level would be for a 
range of marginal water values. In DP the question was what would the release 
this period and stock carried over be for a range of starting storage levels. The 
DDP method has an important economic interpretation, which we discuss in the 
next section. 
5.3 Economic interpretation of DDP as applied to reser-
voir management 
In a situation where a supplier can offer the same goods at the same price to sev-
eral consumer groups, each with known demand curves, the supplier may aggre-
gate the individual demand curves. At any given price, p~ say, the supplier can sell 
d1 to market I, d2 to market 2 and so on up to market n. Hence the total demand 
they will face if they offer price p will be D 2:?=1 di , the sum of all individual 
consumer demands. This corresponds to adding the individual demand curves 
along the quantity axis. 
TIle situation faced by a reservoir manager is similar to that of the supplier 
with many consumer groups. Water in the reservoir this period can be used in 
this period, or it can be stored for use in the next period. In the next period we 
will face the same choice of using the water straight away, or storing for later use. 
Hence our water may be used to generate electricity for sale in any of a number 
of future spot markets, and the demand for that water will be the aggregate of the 
demand from all those periods. Note that the number of future periods that need 
be considered is limited by the storage bounds of our reservoir. If we know the 
reservoir will be full in some future time period then there is no value in commit-
ting any extra water to storage for use beyond that time, as we will not be able to 
carry it over, and it will be spilt. Similarly our reservoir cannot have a negative 
amount in storage, so we may never use more water than we have in storage at a 
given time. These constraints imply that the marginal value of water held in stor-
age is only affected by the value that water would have up until the next time the 
2While the position of hydro in our fum's merit order won't always change, the quantity we 
offer to the Cournot market will. 
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reservoir hits one of its storage bounds. 
Continuing with our analogy with demand curves, we will discuss our method 
in terms of demand for release and demand for storage. The demand curve for release 
(DCR) describes the amount of water we would want to release during a given pe-
riod for a range of marginal water values3• The demand curve for storage (DCS) 
describes the amount of water we would want to hold in storage at the end of a 
given period for a range of marginal water values. Our method will use back-
wards recursion, starting with an end of horizon DCS and working back to the 
beginning of the time horizon. 
In DP terms, the DCS represents the solution to the state functions for the range 
of marginal water values. The DCR is the solution set to the single period objective 
function for the range of marginal water values4 • 
5.4 DDP with general demand curves 
The previous implementations of DDP (Read 1985, Read & Boshier 1989, Yang 
1995, Macgregor 1991) have all considered the more simple case of a centrally co-
ordinated system, equivalent to Pc. In that situation the DCR is piece-wise lin-
ear, a simple step function as shown in Figure 5.1, with the steps representing the 
marginal costs and capacities of the various thermal stations. For a detailed ex-
planation of the procedure see (Read & George 1990), (Macgregor 1991) or (Yang 
1995). The computational advantage of having a stepped DCR is enormous. The 
procedure of adding the DCR to the DCS is replaced by one of inserting flats into 
the DCS. Indeed it is this fact which allows (Macgregor 1991) to report that the 
number of additions required for a 12 period stochastic DP with 5 steps in the 
3If we separate the Hydro Station Manager's problem into two problems, one of storing water 
for sale and the other of buying water to generate with, then the marginal water value is the price 
at which water will be traded between the two problems. The DCR describes the amount to be 
released within the period for a range of marginal water values, and the DCS describes the amount 
to be stored for future use. 
40n the face of it it would seem that our method still uses storage as the state variable in terms 
of the state transfomlation. In fact we believe that the state transformation function is no longer the 
conservation of flow, but now the equating of marginal values over time. The reason for the con-
fusion is that our DCR represents the solution for the full range of the state variable, and contains 
both the primal and the dual information. Thus is it difficult to separate the two in our framework. 
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marginal cost function was over 220000, yet for the same problem solved via stochas-
tic DDP the number of additions required was around 5000. TIle solution time for 
SDDP was less than 2% of that for SDP. 
The case of a stepped DCR is just a special case of our requirement that the 
DCR have the same properties that are normally expected of a demand curve: it 
must be continuous and the slope must be everywhere non-positive. 
When modelling a competitive market the DCR is no longer a step function, 
and the computational advantage of DDP may be largely lost. However the con-
cept is still valid, and intuitive. Further, when viewed as a process of adding de-
mand curves it does not require that there be a well defined underlying benefit 
function to optimiseS. 
5.5 Stepping Back One Period 
As is typical in dynamic programming, we start with the end of the time horizon 
and work back recursively to build up our description of the solution strategy for 
all periods. We start with an end of horizon DCS and derive the DCS for the pre-
vious periods from it. Reference to Figure 5.2 may help in the understanding of 
this process. At the beginning of the final period, each additional unit of water we 
hold in storage could either be used during the period or carried over to the end 
of horizon at known marginal value, as defined by the end of horizon DCS. At a 
particular marginal water value, 'IjJ say, we may expect to sell r t units within the 
period as defined by the DCR, and 8tH units at the end of the period, as defined 
by the DCS. Adding these together gives a total demand for water at the price 'IjJ 
of Tt + 8t+J. We proceed similarly for all values of'IjJ to get the nett demand for wa-
ter as the sum of the two individual demands, that within the period (the DCR) 
and that for the end of the period (the DCS)6. This corresponds, as mentioned ear-
lier, to adding individual demand curves to give a total aggregate demand for the 
whole market. We have not yet taken into account the expected inflow within the 
SIntegration over the DCR would produce a well defined benefit function, to which we could 
apply conventional DP. It is not clear exactly what this benefit function represents, but it is certainly 
not the overall benefit to the finn. It seems likely that it corresponds to the hydro managers sub-
problem, but we leave this as a topic for further research. 
6Note that we do not consider discounting, wastage, head effects etc., but see Macgregor (1991). 
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period, and we do this in the next section. 
5.5.1 Adding Inflows 
91 
The aggregate demand curve we have tells us the value of each additional unit 
of water we have in storage at the beginning of the period. We assume that all 
the inflow, F, arrives at the end of the current period, after the decisions for this 
period have been made. There is no cost for receiving the inflow, and hence the 
value of holding s units of water in storage at the beginning of this period is equal 
to the value of holding s + F units in storage at the end of this period. Hence we 
simply shift the end of period curve to the left by the inflow amount to get the 
beginning of period curve, which is directly equivalent to the end of period curve 
for the previous period7. 
In practice we are not likely to know exactly what the inflow will be in a given 
period, especially many months ahead. We have historical data though, which 
7There are no release decisions made, nor any inflow received, during the instant between the 
end of one period and the beginning of the next, so values at the end of one period are exactly the 
same as at the beginning of the next period. 
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we could use to estimate a range of likely inflows, and their likelihood of occur-
ring. This distribution provides us with a set of possible end of previous period 
marginal value curves, each with a given likelihood. 
Let us assume that the inflow, F, is a discrete random variables with values 
drawn from the set of possible inflows, with associated probabilities /-L: 
Ft E (flt) ... ) fnt) , 
/-Lit = /-L(fit) = P[Ft = fitl) 
and the expected value is 
n 
E(Ft) = L /-Lidit 
i=l 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
For any-given beginning of period storage level for the current period St, say, 
with associated marginal water value 'l/Jstt the expected storage level for the begin-
ning of the next period, after inflows, will be 
(5.6) 
However in DDP our main concern is the expected marginal water value. For a 
given storage level, St, the marginal water value is 'l/Jt+l (St + flt) if inflow flt is go-
ing to occur and 'l/Jt+l (St+ f2t) if inflow ht is going to occur. The expected marginal 
water value is then 
n 
E('l/J(St)) = L/-Li'l/Jt+l(St + fit). (5.7) 
i=l 
This is illustrated in Figure 5.3 for the simple case of two equally likely inflows, 
and in Figure 5.4 for five inflow scenarios with weights of [0.15 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.15]. 
In Figure 5.3 the curve labelled End of period DCS + DCR corresponds to the solid 
curve in Figure 5.2. It represents the marginal value of water in storage at the end 
of period t, just after the inflow arrives (and is known). The two dashed curves 
represent the marginal value of water in storage just before the inflow arrives, 
assuming the inflow will be fIt and ht, respectively. For a particular beginning 
8We asswne there is no correlation from one period to the next, but see (Yang 1995) for a treat-
ment of correlation 
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of period storage levet St say, (before the inflow arrives) we expect the marginal 
value of water in storage to be 1Pt+l (St fIt) if inflow fIt occurs, and 'l/Jt+l (St + ht) 
if inflow ht occurs. Hence the expected marginal value of water in storage is the 
probability weighted average 
(5.8) 
This leads to the beginning of period expected DeS, which becomes our end of 
period Des for the previous period at the next iteration. 
What of the parts of the new DeS for which storage lies outside the bounds? 
If water spilt has no value then there is no value in holding extra water in stor-
age now that will need to be spilt next period, so storage levels above the upper 
bound are assigned a marginal water value of zero. Similarly if we have a fixed 
shortage cost, as is the case with our model9, then the marginal value of any water 
used that will bring the storage level back to the lower bound is just this shortage 
cost, as each extra unit we carry over will be used to curtail a unit of shortage10 . 
The parts of the new DeS that are above the upper storage bound or below the 
lower storage bound are hence truncated at the marginal value of water spilt or of 
shortage, respectively. 
Our complete process for deriving the DeS for the end of a period given the 
Des for the end of the next period, the DeR for within the next period and the set 
of possible inflows is as follows. 
1. add Des for next month to the DeR for next month (along storage axis) 
2. subtract inflow for each possible inflow level, fi' to give the set of possible 
DeS 
9 A fixed shortage cost could also be thought of as a price cap on the short term energy spot mar-
ket. TItis might be an actual cap imposed by the rules of the NZEM, or a perceived cap, imposed 
by threat of regulation, or threat of entry. It might also be a cap implied by a one way contract 
limiting liability to a certain marginal cost. 
10 Although this is true for the centrally coordinated system, it is not strictly correct for the mar-
ket situation. Consider the example of a small firm whose reservoir is empty, and whose thermal 
capacity is fully utilised. Extra units will come not at some arbitrary shortage cost, but at the en-
ergy spot price, which may be lower or higher than the value we have imposed in our model. How-
ever tests by Yang (1995) indicate that this effect is relatively minor for a single national reservoir, 
and since it is not directly relevant to the concerns of this thesis we ignore it here. 
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3. average the DCS along the marginal water value axis according to the prob-
ability weights fLi 
This process is repeated, starting at the end of horizon, stepping back through 
each period to the beginning of horizon. At this stage we have what we term a 
water value surface (WVS) such as that shown in Figure 5.5. 
The only part we have not explained is how we derive the end of horizon DCS. 
In practice this may be given from outside of the model, for example as an end 
of year accounting policy. For our purposes we simply extended the model far 
enough out into the future that the end conditions were not important. To test for 
this, we compared the DCS for the end of horizon to the DCS for the same period 
one year earlier. In equilibrium, given our annual inflow and demand patterns, 
these two DCSs should be the same. If they are not, we simply continue our DDP 
process for another year, and check again. In practice the -process seems to con-
verge between two and three years into the futurell . 
5.6 Operating Rules and the Water Value Surface 
The WVS we have constructed using the procedure detailed in the previous sec-
tions can provide a wealth of information with regards to the operation of our hy-
dro and thermal stations. 
In any given period we may observe the storage level of our reservoir, and then 
read the implied expected marginal water value directly from the water value sur-
face. Once we know the marginal water value we can schedule our system like a 
pure thermal system, with the MWV being the fuel cost of hydro. One method for 
doing this is that explained in Chapter 3. 
The level contours of the WVS are often referred to as guidelines because they 
indicate where hydro fits in our company's merit order. If the contours are drawn 
for MWV s equal to each of our own marginal thermal costs then the storage-time 
region is divided into bands. For each thermal station that has a marginal cost 
lower than the MWV the thermal station should be fully utilised before we start 
using the hydro. For each thermal station that has a marginal cost higher than the 
llSome DDP iterations could be saved by checking at each week to see if we have achieved con-
vergence, rather than just at the end of the horizon, but we did not implement this strategy. 
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MWV the thermal station should not be used at all until hydro is fully utilised12. 
These level contours, then, provide a means of correctly placing hydro in our merit 
order. 
5.7 Demand Curves for Release 
As mentioned throughout this chapter, our DDP method requires us to calculate 
DCRs for each period throughout the time horizon. Given a method for predicting 
the spot market outcome for a set of input parameters, the process of calculating 
the DCRs is relatively simple. 
DDP requires that the OCR be a (non-strictly) monotone decreasing function, 
as is typically expected of demand curves. Three example DCRs which meet this 
requirement are shown in Figure 5.6. Two which don't are shown in Figure 5.7. 
As plotted the DCRs suggest that release is the independent variable, and price 
the dependent variable. Our method for deriving these curves takes the reverse 
approach. 
Remember that our SRM will tell us the spot price and generation levels for 
a given set of marginal costs and other input information. To derive the DCRs 
we run the SRM with a representative range of MWVs, holding all other inputs 
constant. For each MWV we record the corresponding hydro generation. This we 
now think of as the demand for hydro generation for tha t given price (MWV). Plot-
ting hydro generation vs. price for the range of MWV s gives us our required DCR. 
Does the DCR we generate in this fashion meet our requirements for DDP, that 
it be a decreasing function? 
Theorem 5.1. For the maximisation problems described in Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 the DCR 
derived by the method described above is a decreasing function. 
Proof The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 3.2, where we noted that an in-
crease in marginal cost, or in this case marginal water value, implies a decrease in 
the equilibrium generation for aUf firm. If the internal merit order is unchanged 
12In practice exceptions are made for the purpose of meeting reserve requirements, which may 
lead to out of merit order operation. However if spinning reserve is correctly priced (Dray ton-
Bright 1997) then the effective marginal thermal costs will include a spinning reserve component, 
and merit order is preserved. Reserve is not considered here. 
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the increase in marginal water value must imply that either the hydro output is 
unchanged and the thermal output will decrease, or that the hydro output will 
decrease. If the merit order does change then hydro must move to a more expen-
sive place in the order, and will be less utilised. D 
It should be noted that there is a clear distinction between the DCRs and the 
MRCs of Chapter 4. While the DCRs are calculated for a particular demand/ contract 
scenario and a range of MWV s, the MRCs are for a particular set of marginal costs 
and for a 'range of demand scenarios and corresponding contracts. While under 
reasonable conditions (see § 3.9.l)we can expect the DCR to be monotone, the same 
cannot really be said about the MRC, especially if one of the firms is a price taker, 
and the other firm can exploit this. In such cases it is quite possible that a higher 
level of demand will be met with reduced output. An example of this is shown in 
Figure 4.22. 
In practice we model sub-periods with an LDC, representing the range of de-
mands likely within the period. TIlis is no problem for our method, and the mono-
tonicity of the curve is still maintained. The DCRs for each of the sub-pertods will 
be monotonic, as shown earlier. We combine them by taking a simple weighted 
average, that is a convex combination, of the sub-period DCRs, and the convex 
combination of a set of monotone functions is a monotone function (Lasdon 1970). 
As well as requiring the DCRs for each period to be monotone, our DDP ap-
proach requires the DCS in each period to be monotone. Theorem 5.2 considers 
this. 
Theorem 5.2. The DeS produced by the addition of a continuous monotone decreasing 
DeR to a continuous monotone decreasing DeS, as detailed in § 5.5, will also be contin-
uous monotone decreasing. Further, so will the augmented DeS after accounting Jor the 
inflow adjustment, including uncertainty. 
Proof By assumption the DCS and the DCR are continuous monotone decreasing, 
and hence invertable. We can, then, consider the range of marginal water values 
from zero through to the maximum for which either the inverse DCR (DCR- I ) 
or the inverse DCS (DCS- I ) has a positive value. Both DCR- I and DCS- I will 
be defined for all these values13, and so we may add their values to produce the 
13Por simplicity we assume the inverse functions are set to zero for all values where the marginal 
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new inverse DCS, DCS- I . As we increase the marginal water value, the value of 
DCS- I and DCR- I both decrease, and so, therefore, does the new function. Our 
new function is defined over the continuous range of water values, and is mono-
tonic decreasing, and hence invertable to produce the new DCS. 
The inflow adjustment can be thought of as shifting the new OCS back along 
the storage dimension by the (stochastic) inflow amount. Translation will certainly 
preserve our desired properties of being continuous monotone decreasing. As ex-
plained in § 5.5 the uncertainty adjustment for the inflow can be thought of as tak-
ing the weighted average of a set of DCSs, shifted back by the different possible 
inflow amounts (see Figure 5.3). We again have the situation where we are taking 
the convex combination of a set of monotone functions, and our resultant DCS will 
once again be a continuous monotone decreasing function. D 
We have now ascertained that each DCR corresponds to the optimal release 
decisions for the corresponding stage of the DP (5.1)-(5.2). By Theorem 5.1 we 
know that the DCRs are monotone decreasing, and by Theorem 5.2 we also know 
that the DCSs will be continuos monotone decreasing. These DCSs now fully de-
scribe the optimal release policy for any starting marginal water value (or storage). 
That the policy is optimal we know from our requirement that marginal value be 
equated across the stages. This has been achieved by our method of adding de-
mand curves. 
As mentioned earlier, the set of DCSs combined give us a marginal water value 
surface which allows us to detennine the marginal value of water in any period for 
any storage level. Once we have this marginal water value we may use an appro-
priate single period model, such as that described in Chapter 3, to determine op-
timal release levels, which is the ultimate goal of the reservoir management prob-
lem. 
5.8 Observations 
We have presented our DDP approach to the standard reservoir management prob-
lem, but with the added feature that the single period objective function is now 
water value exceeds the range of the original function. 
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described by a market model, rather than a cost minimisation model, as had been 
done in the past. Our method has a strong analogy with the economic concept of 
adding consumer demand curves to get an aggregate demand curve. In our case 
this aggregate demand curve (the DCS) describes demand for water for all future 
periods, at each of a range of marginal water values (prices). 
This method can be used in the absence of a well defined benefit ftmction, and 
requires only that we can calculate release (demand for water within the period) 
as a ftmction of the marginal value of water. One method for doing this is via the 
Coumot game·we described in Chapter 3. 
TI1e WVS shown in Figure 5.5 has a large relatively flat section. The reason 
for this flat section can be seen if we return to the concepts described earlier in 
this Chapter. It is a result of two features. The first is that the DCRs for many 
of the periods had a relatively flat section around that marginal water v.alue, due 
to the large-thermal station owned by the hydro firm. The second is due to the 
effect of repeated addition of DCRs and subtraction of inflows. This results in a 
shear about the marginal water value (of release) corresponding to the mean in-
flow level. 
The steps of each iteration of the DDP process are to add the DCS to the DCR 
and subtract off the inflows. In the deterministic case, where we know the inflow, 
the results of the addition of the DCR and the subtraction of inflows cancel each 
other exactly at the marginal value corresponding to the inflow level, I, that is 
'¢R(J). For the stochastic case this applies to each of the shifted DCSs at their re-
spective inflow levels, and hence to the expected DCS (the weighted average of 
the possible DCSs) at the marginal water value which is the weighted average of 
the marginal values corresponding to each of the possible flows. This is illustrated 
in Figure 5.8 for the simple case of two possible inflows, h and 12. The marginal 
values of releasing hand 12 are '¢R(h) and '¢R(12), respectively. The expected 
marginal value of holding J in storage at the beginning of the period is '¢s(1). As 
can be seen the nett effect is to shear the DCS about the point (I, '¢ (1) ), leading to a 
flatter and flatter section at each iteration. Of course the expected inflow changes 
from period to period, so the WVS is not completely flat. 
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Figure 5.8: Example of the DCS pivoting about the marginal value of the expected inflow level. 
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Chapter 6 
Multiple Period Results 
6.1 Introduction 
While the results and observations regarding the spot market are useful and inter-
esting in their own right, our real goal is to consider the possibilities in the medium 
term, especially regarding the effects of competition and contracts on reservoir 
management. We finally address these issues in this chapter. The chapter is ar-
ranged as follows: 
§ 6.2 A description of the system parameters and a presentation of the results for 
the PC case. 
§ 6.3 The process of calibrating the optimisation. 
§ 6.4 Results for the ee2 model. 
§ 6.5 Results for the ww model. 
§ 6.6 Other results of interest. 
§ 6.7 Conclusions 
6.2 The base case 
We have built a model which represents most of the important features of the New 
Zealand electricity sector with respect to reservoir management in the medium 
105 
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term. Our model is of a duopoly with an inactive fringe l . We only consider reser-
voir management for one of the duopolists, and only for one aggregate reservoir. 
We do not model any transmission constraints, losses or reserve requirements. 
Nor do we consider the issue of correlation, either of inflows or of demand. 
As detailed earlier in this thesis we model the spot market as a Coumot duopoly 
with a competitive fringe, and we use this to build up reservoir release rules for 
our medium term simulation. In these experiments the simulation runs for twenty 
simulated years producing data on generation, release, spot price, consumer and 
producer surplus, storage and fuel costs. 
In this chapter we compile these data for a wide range of conditions and com-
pare and contrast them with the PC case. We find, as we expect given our earlier 
results, that our model is very sensitive to the level of contracting and the elasticity 
of demand. 
The results presented in this chapter are in either of two forms. The first form 
is graphical and represents a summary of the means and standard deviations fo~ a 
set of simulations, with each point plotted coming from a different contract alloca-
tion. The second form is also graphical, and in most cases this is a plot of the dis-
tribution of results for the twenty simulated years. For the graphs lines are drawn 
at the 5, 20, 50, 80 and 95% levels. As an example, for the 20% line, in any given 
week 20% of the time the measured value from the simulation was at or below that 
level. 
The station capacities are as described in Table 6.1 for winter and Table 6.2 for 
summer. Note the extra capacity of Clutha in the summer, which leads to higher 
output for Clutha in summer than in winter, as depicted in Figure 6.4. 
The reference level we make comparisons against is the PC case. Figures 6.1-
6.11 present the PC results for generation, price, water value, storage level, profit 
and consumer surplus. 
IThe fringe is modelled as having a constant level of output for each sub-period. The output 
does vary from one sub-period to the next. In an alternative model which we have developed 
there is one Cournot oligopolist playing against a fringe of perfect competitors, each bidding in at 
marginal cost. Simulation results from the alternative model are not presented in this thesis. 
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Station(s) Capacity Marginal Cost Owner 
Waitaki and 
Waikato2 2455 2.0 Firm 1 
Huntly 900 2.0 Firm 1 
New Plymouth 518 2.5 Firm 2 
Stratford 178 3.5 Firm 2 
Marsden A 103 6.0 Firm 2 
Otahuhu 81 11.0 Firm 2 
Whirinaki 194 15.0 Firm 2 
Clutha 244 0.0 Firm 2 
Manapouri 570 0.0 Firm 1 
Table 6.1: Break-up option ec2, winter levels. 
Station(s) Capacity Marginal Cost Owner 
Waitaki and 
Waikato3 2455 2.0 Firm 1 
Huntly 900 2.0 Firm 1 
New Plymouth 518 2.5 Firm 2 
Stratford 178 3.5 Firm 2 
Marsden A 103 6.0 Firm 2 
Otahuhu 81 11.0 Firm 2 
Whirinaki 194 15.0 Firm 2 
Clutha 639 0.0 Firm 2 
Manapouri 570 0.0 Firm 1 
Table 6.2: Break-up option ec2, summer levels. 
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Figure 6.2: PC thermal generation, Firm One. 
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Figure 6.5: PC total generation, Finn One plus Finn Two. 
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Figure 6.6: PC energy spot price. 
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Figure 6.7: PC marginal water value. 
Figure 6.8: PC storage. 
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Figure 6.9: PC profit, Finn One. 
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Figure 6.10: PC profit, Firm Two. 
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Figure 6.11: PC Consumer Surplus. 
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According to our theory presented earlier the market results should reproduce the 
PC results when we have 100% contracting and 100% back-up. Indeed this will be 
the case when the contracts do exactly match the PC generation. Our model as-
sumes that the contracts are set in advance, and so it is difficult to achieve an ex-
act match. In particular the balance of contracts between the firms and the over-
all level of output both depend upon the marginal water value. When, such as 
in a wet year, water is in abundance, and relatively cheap, output will be higher, 
and the hydro firm (Firm One) will have a greater share of the market. Ideally, the 
contracts should reflect this, and our back-up do contracts go some way towards 
re-balancing the contract market. 
To achieve a better calibration between the 100% contracts case and the PC case 
we run the model once in PC mode, and observe the mean marginal water value 
throughout the 20 year time horizon. We then use this estimate of the marginal 
water value when setting the contracts for the market runs. The effect of this ex-
tra calibration step can be quite marked, as illustrated in Figures 6.12-6.14. The 
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Figure 6.12: Marginal water values, 100% contracts with 100% back-up. Contracts were set assum-
ing the marginal water value would be 3.0. Mean is 2.04. 
mean marginal water value for the PC case is 2.12, and when the contracts are set 
assuming that value the match is quite close. If the marginal water value is er-
roneously assumed to be 3.0 then the results are quite different. The effect is not 
restricted to the marginal water values and, as another example, Figures 6.15-6.17 
show the corresponding storage trajectories. Again the match is good only when 
the correct marginal water value is used. 
The calibration discussed thus far relates to getting internally consistent results 
from the model, that is finding the fully contracted level of contracts. Another 
type of calibration which we need to consider is getting our model to mimic the 
real system of electricity supply in New Zealand. To this end we have tried to 
use broadly realistic data in terms of actual demand, station capacities, expected 
inflow and storage capacity. However our single reservoir model is given signifi-
cantly more freedom with regards to storage than is available to the New Zealand 
system. 
Major long term storage is available in the Waitaki system in the South Island 
(approximately 2550 GWh, or 32% of the average annual inflow) and the Waikato 
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Figure 6.13: Marginal water values, 100% contracts with 100% back-up. Contracts were set assum-
ing the marginal water value would be 2.12. Mean is 2.12. 
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Figure 6.14: Marginal water values, Pc. Mean is 2.12 
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Figure 6.15: Storage trajectory distribution, 100% contracts with 100% back-up. Contracts were set 
assuming the marginal water value would be 3.0. Mean is 1131. 
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Figure 6.16: Storage trajectory distribution, 100% contracts with 100% back-up. Contracts were set 
assuming the marginal water value would be 2.12. Mean is 1426. 
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Figure 6.17: Storage trajectory distribution, Pc. Mean is 1352 
system in the North Island (approximately 650 GWh, or 12% of the average an-
nual inflow), as well as in several smaller reservoirs in both the North and South 
Islands. The transmission lines linking these systems are of finite capacity, and 
may often restrict the ability of the system to transfer energy from one place to 
another. This is particularly relevant to our model when considering the DC link 
between the North and South Islands. If, as is often the case in winter, the DC link 
is fully loaded sending power from the South Island generators to the North Is-
land load centres, then it may not be possible to fully utilise all the release capacity 
in the South Island. Our single reservoir model (with no transmission constraints) 
does not know this, and may well suggest full release when it isn't possible. 
This effect can be thought of in terms of the model thinking it has more freedom 
near the storage bounds than it really does have. One way to counter this is to 
simply restrict the size of the reservoir the model has. The expected outcome from 
this action is to push the storage trajectories to the bounds more often than with a 
larger reservoir. 
To this end we have reduced the reservoir size from 3200 GWh representing the 
Waitaki and Waikato systems, down to 2900 GWh, a reduction of about 9.4%. The 
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Figure 6.18: Storage trajectory distribution, 80% contracts with no back-up. Storage capacity is 
3200 GWh. Mean is 1552. 
resulting effect on the storage trajectories can be seen by comparing Figure 6.18 to 
Figure 6.19. As well as the change in storage trajectories, the reduction in reser-
voir size affects the fuel cost, the marginal water value and the spot price. The 
reduction in reservoir size is a reduction in freedom, and comes at a price. 
A third factor to be considered when calibrating the model is the interval size 
on the grid of water values. This is the set of values that we sample at in the single 
period model. Obviously, finer resolution leads to greater accuracy, but at some 
computational cost. A question to be asked is what level of resolution is required 
to produce some acceptable level of accuracy? We have not made a detailed com-
parison in this study, but instead opted to err on the side of caution with a rela-
tively fine grid4• 
4Initial experiments indicated that the difference between ten grid points and twenty grid 
points was easily observable, but the difference between fifty and one hundred was not. Since 
one hundred points was within the scope of our computer system we settled for that number. 
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Figure 6.19: Storage trajectory distribution, 80% contracts with no back-up. Storage capacity is 
2900 GWh. Mean is 1431. The mean trajectory from Figure 6.18 is shown as a dashed line for com-
parison. 
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A fourth consideration is the number of weeks for which we should run the 
single period model. While there is a great difference between the peak winter 
load and the lowest summer load, the variation from week to week in a given 
season is much less extreme. Our long term model takes a set of weeks repre-
senting the range of loads throughout the year, and interpolates to get values for 
the missing weeks. This may mean that we run the single period model for only 
two weeks, mid-winter and mid-summer, and interpolate for the rest, or we may 
sample every four weeks, or even every week. The sampling process is expensive 
computationally, and without accurate load data it seems pointless to go to the ex-
treme of sampling every week. In fact if we are aiming to investigate trends rather 
than to come up with accurate quantitative results then the opposite extreme of 
one winter and one summer period is adequate. 
6.4 Results for the ee2 model 
Figure 6.20 shows the means and standard deviations of the total generation for. 
Firm One for a range of contract levels. The contracts range from 50% to 120% for 
each firm. However the results are plotted against the total contract amount rather 
than the percentages. The reason for this is that our earlier analysis (Chapter 3) 
demonstrated that the important factor is the total contract amount rather than 
the percentages. This also presents a more consistent picture when, as is the case 
here, the firms are of rather uneven sizes. 
Each point in Figure 6.20 is a summary of a twenty year simulation run for a 
particular combination of contracts. The PC amount is plotted as a circle rather 
than a plus sign. Appendix A contains the complete set of summary graphs for 
generation, price, water value, storage levet profit and consumer surplus. For 
each variable we present graphs for three levels of back-up contracting and three 
levels of elasticity. 
Recall that in Chapter 4 we observed in our study of the PDI that as back-up 
increased it became less important which firm had contracts. For low levels of 
back-up we observed that Firm One's contracting had greater influence on price 
distortion than did Firm Two's. For high levels of back-up this was no longer the 
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case. An interesting question, then is to ask if this carries over to the simulation re-
sults. If it does, then there may be good grounds for leaving out a lot of the added 
complications of a hydro simulation model and instead basing further research on 
single period models and thermal systems. If the results do not carry over from 
the single period to the simulation, then we have empirical evidence that the hy-
dro system is bringing added complexities to the market and it will be important 
to keep that in mind in any future work. 
Given that our single period observations were centred around price distor-
tion, it would seem likely that if similarities are to be found between any of the 
simulation results and the single period results, then they will be found in the 
measures of the energy spot price. These are shown in Figures A.36-A.42. 
As was the case in Chapter 4, one striking feature of these graphs is that there 
are bands of points. Within each band the contracts for Firm One are constant, 
and those for Firm Two are increasing. While we see to some extent that as back-
up increases the bands tend to merge into one, indicating that the market is less 
sensitive to the original allocation of contracts, the merging is not as extensive as it 
was in Figure 4.21. The most likely explanation seems to be that it is a result of the 
back-up contracts being based on the expected marginal water value, not the actual 
marginal water value. We set the back-up contracts assuming the marginal water 
value would be 2.12, and only when the actual value is the same as this expected· 
value do we get a perfect match. 
For the firms in our Coumot model of the energy market generation is the con-
trollable factor. Figures A.1-A.7 show the total generation for Firm One. This is 
broken down into thermal (plus run of river hydro) in Figures A.8-A.14 and hy-
dro in Figures A.1S-A.21. As expected from the single period model and from 
intuition, generation increases as contracts increase for the firms. With no back-
up, and moderate to high levels of contracting we see that Firm One's output de-
creases as Firm Two's contracts (and hence their output) increases. This is the nor-
mal behaviour expected, and stems from the negative slope of the reaction func-
tions, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Note that although the generation is very sensitive to the contracts, it is less 
5Recall that along each band the contracts for Firm One are constant, and those for Finn Two 
are changing. 
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Figure 6.20: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One. Elasticity = -0.1, no 
back-up. 
so to our choice of demand elasticity, within reason. At low contracting levels the 
sensitivity to elasticity is enhanced. Note qlso that there is a much greater change 
between elasticities of -0.1 and -0.33 than there is between -0.33 and -O.S. How-
ever, checking the energy spot price in Figure A.36 indicates that such a situation 
is unlikely to occur in practice, especially on an ongoing basis. Energy spot prices 
of 50 cents per kiloWatt-hour are likely to bring new entry at the least, and most 
likely Government intervention as well. This should not be seen as a sign that our 
model has failed, but more simply that we are operating it outside its intended 
range. In particular our point estimate of the demand was at less than five cents, 
and to extrapolate to more than 50 cents is not wise. With 100% contracting and 
100% back-up the market output exactly matches the PC levels6. 
6100% contracting has the same total contract quantity as the PC point, shown as a circle in the 
graphs. 
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If we ignore the extreme parts of Figure A.l then we can observe that the stan-
dard deviations of Firm One's generation is decreasing as contracts increase. Con-
versely the standard deviations of the thermal and hydro components is increas-
ing as contracts increase. At low levels of contracting almost all the variation is in-
hydro output, due to inflow variations. As contracting increases it becomes more 
important for the firm to meet the contract target, and the standard deviations of 
total generation fall. However, the hydro inflow is still subject to random varia-
tions, and the firm uses its thermal capacity to offset these variations, leading to 
an increase in variation in both hydro and thermal generation. The correspond-
ing storage plots of Figures A.64-A.70 reinforce this idea, as storage variation is 
also decreaSing as contracts increase, showing once again a tendency to let release 
follow inflow. 
Another interesting point regarding the graphs of standard deviation of total 
generation is that it peaks at around 2000 MW, and drops off on either side. It 
seems that the reason for increased variation in output is the shape of our marginal 
cost curve. Our model has Manapouri as a run of river hydro station with capacity 
of 570 MW. This corresponds to just under 100 GWh per week, which is the level 
of the large flat section, especially seen in Figure A.II. Over this region the Man-
apouri is at full capacity, and Huntly is not yet running. This restricts the abilitiy 
to use the thermal capacity to manage inflow variations, and hence total variation 
increases. 
Firm Two's generation is shown in Figures A.22-A.27. As expected it increases 
as Firm Two's contract amount increases (along each band) and decreases as Firm 
One's contracts increase (between bands). For the most part it is above the PC 
level, a result of our initial contract allocation which has left Firm Two over con-
tracted. Again it exactly matches PC for 100% contracting and 100% back-up. For 
the cases where there is no back-up the standard deviations are decreasing as con-
tracts increase, showing the firm's desire to more closely match output with con-
tracts. With back-up, the situation is less clear, especially for low contracting lev-
els. 
Since our demand curve has a negative slope, increased generation leads to 
decreased prices. Since generation increases with contracts, price must decrease. 
At 100% contracting and 100% back-up the spot price exactly matches that of Pc. 
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However the standard deviations of price follow the same trend as total market 
generation, not the opposite ones. Whereas an increase in generation implies an 
increase in price, an increase in variance of generation implies an increase in vari-
ance of spot price. 
Spot price is affected by the elasticity of demand and, as with generation, the 
effect is most pronounced at low levels of contracts. For moderate to high levels 
of contracting the difference in spot price for the elasticities considered is less than 
their standard deviations. 
The profif- (Figures A.43-A.56) of each of the firms decreases with increasing 
contracts, and in particular it decreases with increasing contracts of the other firm. 
It is clear from the graphs that for a firm to make profits above the PC level re-
quires, in most cases, that both firms be under contracted. Note that for the pur-
pose of these profit calculations the contracts were valued at the spot price. This 
situation could conceivably arise in a stable market where the spot price from one 
year fed through to the contract strike price for the following year. 
An interesting use for the calculations in these graphs would be to value the 
contracts. The increase in profit between one contract position and another should 
be a good estimate of the value to the firm of moving from the one position to 
the other. That this value is negative for increasing contracts indicates that the 
firms should be selling contracts at a premium. Similar analysis of the consumer 
surplus (Figures A.71-A.77) indicates that the consumers should be willing to pay 
a premium to get the contracts8 . 
Also of note is the fact that the standard deviations of Firm One's profit is low-
est at low contract levels, precisely when their profit is the highest. From a port-
-folio analysis perspective this is ideal, having high profit and low variance. How-
ever the same is not true for Firm Two, and neither is it so for the consumer sur-
plus. Together these imply that the equilibrium point is likely to be above the 50% 
level which we used as our lower extreme. Again see Batstone (1997). 
As discussed above, at high levels of contracting the firms will be trying to 
generate close to their contracted amounts. For Firm One, with the hydro reser-
voir, this implies that any shortfall in inflow will be made up for with thermal 
7We only consider the variable part of the profit, ignoring fixed costs and payments that are 
beyond our inunediate control. 
8See Batstone (1997) for an equilibrium analysis based on this idea, and also Powell (1993). 
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generation, at their marginal thermal cost. Thus the marginal water value should 
approach this marginal thermal cost as contracts approach 100%. At low levels 
of contracting the firm will be more indifferent to spill9, and the marginal water 
value will be lower. This is precisely the behaviour shown in Figures A.57-A.63. 
The standard deviations of the marginal water values will tend to be low at 
both extremely low and extremely high levels of contracting. At low levels water 
in storage is of little value to us as we are restricting supply considerably anyway. 
At high levels of contracting the marginal water value is at the marginal thermal 
cost, regardless of inflows. In between the marginal water value will vary depend-
ing on the inflow levels. 
Storage is driven by marginal water values. For low contracting we have a low 
marginal water value and a high mean storage level1o. As contracting increases 
the mean storage level decreases to around the PC level/but then seems to rise 
again. The reason for this is not clear, and it would be of interest to conduct an 
experiment where contracting was allowed to range much higher than the levels 
we have considered to see if the effect continues. 
In summary, with increasing contracts we can expect the following: 
• increasing output 
• decreasing energy spot price 
• decreasing profit 
• increasing consumer surplus 
• increasing marginal value of water 
• decreasing storage. 
low levels of contracting the firms will both be withholding generation from the market in 
order to extract monopoly profits. An extra unit of generation under these circumstances would 
actually decrease profits, so the only economic use for the extra water is to offset thermal costs. 
However with less total generation there is less thermal generation to offset, and the chances of 
finding a use for the water before the reservoir is full are less. All of this implies that the marginal 
value of water is less at low contract levels than it is at high contract levels. 
10'This has an associated increase in risk of spill, leading to a decrease in the hydro generation. 
'This is clearly shown in Figure A.15 and Figure A.64. 
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6.5 Results for the ww model 
The same general trends we observed for the ec2 model are evident in the ww model. 
However it is interesting to compare the levels in the ww model with the corre-
sponding results from the ec2 model. The Wtu results are shown in Figures A.7B-
A.BB. 
Recall that the allocation of stations to the two firms, and to the fringe, is shown 
in Table 4.2. In this model Firm One has only the major hydro with storage. It does 
not have any thermal, with Huntly being in Firm Two, and no run of river hydro, 
that all being in the fringe. As a result their thermal generation is zero, and the hy-
dro generation matches their total generation. Also, the total capacity shared by 
the two firms is considerably less than under the ec2 option, and hence the PC gen-
eration from the firms is lower, and the range of contract quantities (correspond-
ing to 50%-120%) is less. (The fringe generation is up, since they now have both 
Clutha and Manapouri.) Also note that Firm Two actually holds more low merit 
order capacity than Firm one, as Huntly is priced below the assumed marginal 
water value of 2.12. In terms of the summary graphs, the large (horizontal) gaps 
between the plotted points are for increasing contracts of Firm Two, and the small 
gaps for increasing contracts of Firm One. This is the opposite ofwhatis presented 
in the results for the ec2 model. Thus in Figure A.B1 G2 is increasing with increas-
ing contracts for Firm Two, and decreasing with increasing contracts for Firm One, 
as expected. 
The hydro generation of Firm One remains fairly constant, although with slightly 
lower output and lower standard deviation than in ec2. Firm Two, however, is 
consistently generating at above their PC level, and as a result the energy spot 
price is consistently less than Pc. The cause for this somewhat counter-intuitive 
behaviour is the lower than expected marginal water value. The contracts were 
set assuming a marginal water value of 2.12, but as Figure A.B6 shows, the actual 
value in the simulation was most times less than 1.0. Under PC, low water val-
ues would imply a shift of generation from thermal to hydro. The market model, 
however, has contracts for Firm Two at well above this PC level, even when it is 
below the PC level for a water value of 2.12. Hence Firm Two chooses to generate 
at a level close to their contract amount, and well above the PC level. 
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The lower hydro output appears to be a result of the low marginal water values 
and the correspondingly high storage levels, leading to increased risk of spill. 
6.6 Other interesting results 
An interesting effect can be seen if we allow the contracts to be set differently in 
winter than they are in summer. In this section we consider two cases. In the first 
case we set summer contracts at 100% and winter contracts at 75%. In the second 
case we set summer contracts at 75% and winter contracts at 100%. In both cases 
the back-up is 100%. 
The results from the first case are shown in Figures 6.21-6.24. What we notice 
is that the expected seasonal variations are reinforced by the combination of con-
tracts. The spot price is low in summer, aided by full contracting, and it is high 
in winter, pushed even more so by the low contracting. In addition the water val-
ues are slightly higher, and the storage trajectory is lower and less extreme, with 
decreased chance of spill. 
Conversely, for Figures 6.25-6.28 the contracts oppose the natural seasonal vari-
ations, and do so to such an extent that we have a higher energy spot price in sum-
mer than we do in winter. The water values are lower, and the storage trajectory 
is more extreme, leading to increased chance of spill. 
Such a situation may seem extreme, but it does seem reasonable to expect higher 
percentage contracting in winter than in summer. 
6.7 Conclusions 
We considered contracts ranging from 50% of the PC levels to 120% of the PC lev-
els. Through careful calibration we achieved an almost perfect match between PC 
and 100% contracting, which is exactly what we had hoped for. This calibration 
involved adjusting the parameter describing the expected marginal water value 
to equate it with the mean marginal water value seen under Pc. This affected the 
initial contract allocation. In addition, we restricted the size of the storage reser-
voir to help account for the bias from only modelling one reservoir. 
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Figure 6.21: Energy spot price. Summer 100%, Winter 75%, 100% back-up. 
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Figure 6.22: Marginal water value. Summer 100%, Wmter 75%, 100% back-up. 
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Figure 6.23: Storage. Summer 100%, Winter 75%, 100% back-up. 
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Figure 6.24: Hydro generation. Summer 100%, Winter 75%; 100% back-up. 
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Figure 6.25: Energy spot price. Summer 75%, Winter 100%, 100% back-up. 
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Figure 6.26: Marginal water value. Summer 75%, Winter 100%, 100% back-up. 
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Figure 6.27: Storage. Summer 75%, Winter 100%, 100% back-up. 
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Figure 6.28: Hydro generation. Summer 75%, Winter 100%, 100% back-up. 
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We have presented a range of results from the simulation runs. concentrating 
on the ee2 model, mostly because it best represents the split of companies in the 
NZEM. The range of elasticities we studied is from -0.1 to -0.8, which covers 
most reasonable estimates of the medium term elasticity of demand. We sum-
marised our conclusions by saying that with increasing contracts we can expect 
the following: 
• increasing output 
• decreasing energy spot price 
• decreasing profit 
• increasing consumer surplus 
• increasing marginal value of water 
• decreasing storage. 
Comparison with the ww model in which Firm One has only hydro stations, 
not thermal, indicated that the ww model lead to lower energy spot price and higher 
output than under ee2. higher storage trajectories lead to increased risk of spill. 
Finally we presented a paradoxical situation where low contracts in summer 
and high contracts in winter lead to the summer energy spot price being higher 
than the winter one. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
This chapter surrunarises the main results and ideas presented in this thesis, and 
outlines possible areas for future study. 
This thesis combines two important areas of energy seCtor modelling. They are 
the modelling of competitive electricity markets, and the optimisation and simu-
lation of hydro reservoir systems. 
7.1 Single Period Model 
We have modelled the NZEM as a simple Coumot market trading only in energy .. 
This allowed us to keep the single period model relatively simple, but still cap-
tured much of the dynamic behaviour of the energy spot market. The basic Coumot 
model is extended to allow consideration of contracts, and much of this thesis is 
studying the effects of those contracts. 
Although we settled on the reasonably simple Coumot oligopoly model as a 
basis for our single period model, other models may be better suited to the NZEM 
as it has now evolved. In particular the bidding process of the NZEM might be 
better modelled as a multi-stage game. 
To be more thorough and more realistic the spot market model should also con-
sider the reserve market, and should account for transmission constraints and op-
timal nodal pricing. 
As long as the spot market model produces downward sloping demand curves 
for release, we will be able to incorporate it into the DDP framework as presented 
133 
134 Chapter 7. Conclusions 
in this thesis, and we will have an effective system for optimising reservoir man-
agement in the NZEM. 
In Chapter 3 we developed the theory behind our Coumot model, and proved 
the existence of unique equilibria for both linear and constant elasticity demand 
curves. The proofs also enabled us to show that our Coumot model will produce 
the downward sloping demand curves for release that are required for the DDP 
optimisation. 
_Our experiments with the single period model lead us to conclude that the sin-
gle biggest effect on price distortion is the level of contracting, with the generation 
rising and energy spot price falling as contracts increase. However the elasticity 
of demand also, predictably, has a large influence on the level of distortion. 
With full back-up, the level of price distortion decreases monotonically with 
increasing ~arket contract quantities. With less than full back-up the price distor-
tion still decreases, but the contracts of the larger firm have a much greater impact 
than do those of the smaller firm. 
The market power of a firm is influenced not only by their total capacity, but 
also by their portfolio, that is by their capacity at different price levels. Firms with 
low merit order plant are better able to influence the market than those with higher 
marginal cost plant. 
We found that the choice between linear and constant elasticity demand curves 
for the single period model is somewhat arbitrary. Both give believable results, 
but the linear demand curve leads to analytic solutions, where the constant elastic-
ity curve requires a numerical solution method. However the numerical solution 
converges very quickly, and both approaches are tractable. 
The ww break-up option has lesser price distortions than the ec2 model. The 
reason seems to be that in the latter model one firm is roughly twice the size of 
the other, and has much greater ability to influence the market. In the ww model 
are more closely matched in size. 
We also briefly studied the situation where one of the firms acts as a price taker, 
and noted that this had the very desirable effect of moderating distortions. How-
ever it did sometimes lead to non-monotonicities, and hence difficulties with the 
medium term model. 
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7.2 Dual Dynamic Programming and Reservoir Man-
agement 
We have presented the DDP approach to reservoir mangement and explained how 
it closely relates to standard economic processes and principles. We have shown 
that DDP is equivalent to the process of adding demand curves for different time 
periods, and that as long as the individual demand curves are downward sloping 
the process will yield an optimal water value surface. That water value surface is 
a concise representation of the marginal value of water at any given storage level 
and for any point throughout the time horizon. 
While we have presented a single reservoir model here, DDP can be extended 
to two or more reservoirs, although this comes at some considerable computa-
tional expense (the curse of dimensionality). For the NZEM, and in conjunction 
with incorporating transmission constraints into the single period model, a two 
reservoir model may offer some gain in accuracy. 
7.3 Simulation Results 
The simulation runs have clearly demonstrated the strong link between contracts 
and generation levels. This was expected from the theory we developed in Chap-
ter 3. The simulations have also demonstrated the sensitivity of the model to changes 
in elasticity of demand. If a model such as this is to be implemented then it would 
be wise to further refine the demand side description, if only by trying to better 
estimate the true demand elasticity. 
We summarised our conclusions from the simulation runs by saying that with 
increasing contracts we can expect the following: 
• increasing output 
• decreasing energy spot price· 
• decreasing profit 
• increasing consumer surplus 
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• increasing marginal value of water 
• decreasing storage. 
The tests between the two market structures we considered indicate that the 
ww structure, with Firm One owning only the Waitaki and Waikato systems, with 
Firm Two having all the thermal and geothermal plant, and the fringe having Clutha 
and Manapouri, gave higher output and lower prices for every level-of contract-
mg. 
The case where the market is more heavily contracted in winter than in sum-
mer lead to the interesting situation of higher spot prices in summer than in win-
ter. 
When the market is sufficiently under-contracted there is an increased likeli-
hood of spill, even though energy is being withheld from the market.- This can 
mean that a- generator finds it optimal to spill even though they are not running 
at full capacity, a very unattractive proposition. 
However with reasonable levels of contracting it appears that the wholesale 
electricity market is not too far away from perfect competition. 
7.4 Future work 
A major dynamic factor we have not captured in our model is the way in which 
contracts are negotiated over time. It is reasonable to expect that prices today will 
influence both the price consumers will pay for contracts (in the medium term) 
and the overall demand for electricity (in the longer term). The renegotiation of 
contracts is considered by Batstone (1997), and in his forthcoming PhD thesis. 
Adjusting our model to allow feedback from the spot prices to the future de-
mand and contracts would certainly add an extra dimension of reality to our work. 
Our DDP framework would work equally well with other single period mod-
els, and now that the New Zealand situation is better known it would be worth-
while investigating alternatives to our Cournot model. A model which better rep-
resents the dynamics of the demand side may add some further insights. Also 
worth considering would be the modelling of the transmission system in some 
form, and the parallel market for reserve energy. 
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If the transmission system were to be modelled, it would be worthwhile mov-
ing to a two reservoir DDP model at the same time. Such a model, if well planned, 
should be well within the capabilities of todays computer systems. 
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Figure A.2: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Finn One. Elasticity = -0.33, no 
back-up. 
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Figure A.6: Means and standard deviations of total generationl Finn One. Elasticity = -0.33, 100% 
back-up. 
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Figure A.9: Means and standard deviations of thermal generation, Firm One. Elasticity = -0.33, no 
back-up. 
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Figure A.13: Means and standard deviations of thermal generation, Finn One. Elasticity = -0.33, 
100% back-up. 
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Elasticity = -0.1, no back-up 
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Figure A.16: Means and standard deviations of hydro generation. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up 
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Elasticity = -0.33,50% back-up 
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Figure A.18: Means and standard deviations of hydro generation. Elasticity = -0.33,50% back-up. 
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Figure A.19: Means and standard deviations of hydro generation. Elasticity = -0.8,50% back-up. 
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Figure A.20: Means and standard deviations of hydro generation. Elasticity -0.33,100% back-up. 
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Figure A.21: Means and standard deviations of hydro generation. Elasticity = -0.8,100% back-up. 
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Figure A.22: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity == -0.1, no back-up. 
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Figure A.23: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-
up. 
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Figure A.24: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up. 
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Figure A.25: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.33, 50% back-
up. 
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Figure A.26: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.8, 50% back-
up. 
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Figure A,27: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.33, 100% 
back-up. 
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Figure A.28: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.8, 100% back-
up. 
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Figure A.29: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One plus Firm Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.1, no back-up. 
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Figure A.30: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One plus Firm Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.31: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One plus Firm Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.8, no back-up. 
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Figure A.32: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One plus Firm Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.33, 50% back-up. 
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Figure A.33: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One plus Firm Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.8,50% back-up. 
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Figure A.34: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Finn One plus Firm Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.33, 100% back-up. 
Elasticity = -0.8, 100% back-up 
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Figure A.35: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One plus Finn Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.8, 100% back-up. 
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Figure A36: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity = -0.1, no back-up. 
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Figure A.37: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up 
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Figure A.38: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up. 
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Figure A.39: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity = -0.33,50% back-up. 
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Figure AAO: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity = -0.8, 50% back-up. 
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Figure A.41: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity::: -0.33, 100% back-up. 
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Figure A.42: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity = -O.S, 100% back-up. 
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Figure A.43: Means and standard deviations of profit, Finn One. Elasticity = -0.1, no back-up. 
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Figure A.44: Means and standard deviations of profit, Finn One. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
:;:: 
J: 
-0 
:!! 
'" 
'" ~
X 105 Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up 
11 
+ 
+ 
10 + + 
+ + 
+ + + 9 + + 
+++ 
8 
7 
6L-__________ ~ __________ -l ____________ ~ __________ -L __________ __ 
1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 
Total contract quantity 
Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up X 10' 
8~--------_.----------_r----------._----------,_--------__, 
2000 
+ 
2500 
+ 
+ 
++++ 
+ 
3000 
Total contract quantity 
3500 4000 
Figure A.45: Means and standard deviations of profit, Finn One. Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up. 
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Figure A.46: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm One. Elasticity::: -0.33,50% back-up. 
x 105 
10 
+ 
+ 
'0 
c: 
+ + + 
+ + 
+ + + + 
+ 
'0 7 
l!J 
+ + 
+ + 
'" 
'" 6 :::;:
5 
4 
1500 2000 
x 10' 
Elasticity = -0.8,50% back-up 
+ 
+ + + + + + + + 
+ + + 
+ + + + 0 
+ + + + 
+ + + 
+ 
2500 3000 
Total contract quantity 
Elasticity = -0.8,50% back-up 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + + 
+ + + 
+ + 
+ 
3500 4000 
8r-----------~----------,_----------._----------_r----------, 
-= 8 
~6 
§ 
"' 
'S 4 
'" "0 
"2 
.g2 
c: 
"' ill 
o 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ + + 
+ ++ + + 
++ 
++ + + 
+ 
o~+~+~+--------~----------~----------~----------~-----------
1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 
Total contract quantity 
Figure A.47: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm One. Elasticity = -0.8, 50% back-up. 
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Figure A.48: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm One. Elasticity -0.33, 100% back-up. 
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Figure A,49: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm One. Elasticity = -0.8, 100% back-up. 
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Figure A.51: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.52: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up. 
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Figure A.53: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.33, 50% back-up. 
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Figure A.54: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.8, 50% back-up. 
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Elasticity = -D.8, 100% back-up x lOS 
7,----------,----------,----------r----------,----------, 
+ 6 + + + 
++ 
'i55 + + + ++ 
++ ++ 3:: + + + ++ ~4 ++++ + + + ++ ++++ + + ++ ++ + + 
" 
+ + ++ ~3 ++ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
2 + 
o 
1L---------~-----------L----------~----------~--------~ 
1500 2000 
X 10' 
2500 3000 
Total contract quantity 
Elasticity = -0.8, 100% back-up 
3500 4000 
4,----------,-----------r-----------r----------,-----------, 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
oL-________ ~ __________ -L __________ ~ __________ ~ ________ __ 
1500 2000 2500 3000 
Total contract quantity 
3500 4000 
Figure A.S6: Means and standard deviations of profit, Finn Two. Elasticity = -0.8,100% back-up. 
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Figure A.57: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity == -0.1, no back-up. 
A.l. Results for the ec2 model 
2.5 
2 
> 2: 15 
o 
If! 
:;'l 1 
~ 
0.5 
Elasticity -0.33, no back-up 
++++++++ 
++++++++ 
++++++++ 
O~----··········LI ______ '--_____ _'_ _____ ----''--____ _ 
1500 
0.8 
> ~ 
'00.6 
If! 
o 
:c 
.~ 0.4 
., 
"" 
"" ... 
'" 1l 0.2 
'" if) ++++++++ 
2000 2500 3000 
Total contract quantity 
Elasticity -0.33, no back -up 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ + 
++ 
+ 
3500 4000 
+ 
oL--------~-----------L----------~--------~~--------~ 
1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 
Total contract quantity 
179 
Figure A.S8: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-
up. 
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Figure A.59: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up. 
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Figure A.60: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity = -0.33, 50% back-
up. 
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Figure A.61: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity = -0.8, 50% back-
up. 
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Figure A,62: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity = -0.33, 100% 
back-up. 
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Figure A,63: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity = -0.8, 100% back-
up. 
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Figure A64: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity = -0.1, no back-up. 
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Figure A.65: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.66: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity = -0.8, no back-up. 
183 
184 Appendix A. Multiple Period Results - Summary graphs 
Elasticity = ~Q,33, 50% back~up 
~00r----------'----------~-----------r----------~----------. 
~2000 
..... 
a 
l!! 
o:l 
::E 1500 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
++ 
+ + 
Total contract quantity 
Elasticity ~0.33, 50% back-up 
+ + 
++ + 
+ 
+ + 
3500 4000 
+:t 
++(fl 
300~:-----------L----------~----------~----~-*-+~+~±~t~$~+~+~+~+~+ __ --~ 
1500 2000 ~ 3000 3500 4000 
Tolal contract quantity 
Figure A.67: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity = -0.33, 50% back-up. 
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Figure A.68: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity = -0.8, 50% back-up. 
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Figure A.69: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity -0.33,100% back-up. 
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Figure A.70: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity ::::: -O.B, 100% back-up. 
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Figure A.71: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity -0.1, no back-up. 
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Figure A.72: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.73: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity = -O.S, no back-up. 
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Figure A.74: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity = -0.33, 50% back-
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Figure A.75: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity = -0.8, 50% back-up. 
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Figure A.76: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity = -0.33, 100% back-
up. 
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Figure A.77: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity = -0.8, 100% back-
up. 
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Figure A.78: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One. Elasticity = -0.33, no 
back-up. 
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Figure A.79: Means and standard deviations of thermal generation, Firm One. Elasticity = -0.33, 
no back-up. 
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Figure A.80: Means and standard deviations of hydro generation. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.81: Means and standard deviations of generation, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-
up. 
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Figure A.82: Means and standard deviations of total generation, Firm One plus Firm Two. Elas-
ticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.83: Means and standard deviations of energy spot price. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.84: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm One. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.8S: Means and standard deviations of profit, Firm Two. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.86: Means and standard deviations of marginal water value. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-
up. 
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Figure A.87: Means and standard deviations of storage. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
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Figure A.88: Means and standard deviations of Consumer Surplus. Elasticity = -0.33, no back-up. 
